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ADDRESSING DILEMMAS OF THE GLOBAL AND THE
LOCAL IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Dustin N. Sharp∗†
ABSTRACT
The importance of “the local” (local ownership, local values, local
practices, etc.) in matters of post-conflict peacebuilding and transitional
justice has become an increasingly common trope in academic and policy
discourse. Yet despite its centrality, concepts like “local ownership” remain
vague and poorly understood, often being associated more with aspirational
rhetoric than concrete policy reality. Examined more deeply, the seeming
consensus about the importance of the local in transitional justice masks a
profound ambivalence arising out of a clash of normative commitments:
between liberal internationalism and international human rights on the one
hand, and principles of local sovereignty and autonomy on the other. Striking
a better balance between these commitments represents one of the key policy
challenges of 21st century transitional justice. To this end, this Article seeks to
analyze and deconstruct the concept of the local in the transitional justice
context, exploring its promises and pitfalls. In particular, I argue that
understanding global-local dilemmas requires one to unpack the concept of
local ownership, distinguishing concerns about actual control (agency,
decision making, funding), process (bottom-up, participatory, homegrown),
and substance (values, practices, priorities), even if those concerns are in
practice highly related. Deconstruction of the concept of the local, in turn,
tends to destabilize, breaking down simple binary notions of global and local.
Going forward, achieving a better global-local balance along the multiple
dimensions of local ownership may help to generate new and innovative
approaches that take us beyond the transitional justice “toolbox.”

∗ Dustin Sharp, JD, Harvard Law School. Assistant Professor at the Kroc School of Peace Studies at the
University of San Diego. The author can be contacted at dsharp@sandiego.edu.
† I would like to thank Adam Branch, Thomas Obel Hansen, Joanna Quinn, Chandra Lekha Sriram, and
Necla Tschirgi and for their astute comments on earlier versions of this article. All errors are entirely my own.
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INTRODUCTION
The importance of “the local” (local ownership, local values, local
practices, etc.) is an increasingly common trope in post-conflict peacebuilding
and transitional justice discourse.1 While transitional justice solutions have at
times been imposed from the outside, it is now acknowledged that the United
Nations (UN) must better support “local ownership” in matters of post-conflict
justice and that “due regard” must be given to local justice and reconciliation
traditions.2 Paeans to the value of the local in policy circles are paralleled by a
growing body of scholarship on the topic that has sought to explore the
complexities of bringing dimensions of the local from the periphery to the
foreground of transitional justice work.3 Put succinctly, the current moment in
transitional justice is marked by a veritable “fascination with locality.”4
While the reasons for this growing attention are complex, it could be said to
reflect the commonsense understanding that peace processes and justice
mechanisms not embraced by those who have to live with them are unlikely to
be successful in the long term.5 Interventions perceived as being imposed
“from the outside” may spark backlash and resentment that undermines both
legitimacy and effectiveness.6 In that sense, grappling with the dilemmas of the

1 See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate
Aftermath of Conflict, para. 7, U.N. Doc. A/63/881-S/2009/304 (June 11, 2009) (“The imperative of national
ownership is a central theme of the present report . . . .”) [hereinafter Report of the Secretary General]; U.N.
Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, para. 16–
17, 36, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004) (arguing that the U.N. must “learn better how to respect and
support local ownership, local leadership and a local constituency for reform.”) [hereinafter The Rule of Law];
Simon Chesterman, Walking Softly in Afghanistan: The Future of U.N. Statebuilding, 44 SURVIVAL 37, 41
(2002) (“[E]very U.N. mission and development program now stresses the importance of local ‘ownership.’”).
2 The Rule of Law, supra note 1, at para. 16–17, 36; Chandra Sriram, Justice as Peace? Liberal
Peacebuilding and Strategies of Transitional Justice, 21 GLOBAL SOC’Y 579, 591 (2007).
3 See, e.g., TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: GLOBAL MECHANISMS AND LOCAL REALITIES AFTER GENOCIDE AND
MASS VIOLENCE (Alexander Hinton, ed., Rutgers University Press 2010); CUSTOMARY JUSTICE AND THE RULE
OF LAW IN WAR-TORN SOCIETIES (Deborah Isser, ed., United States Institute of Peace 2011); LOCALIZING
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: INTERVENTIONS AND PRIORITIES AFTER MASS VIOLENCE (Rosalind Shaw & Lars
Waldorf eds., Stanford University Press 2010); Elizabeth Stanley, Transitional Justice: From the Local to the
International, in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Patrick
Hayden ed., 2009); Erin Baines, Spirits and Social Reconstruction After Mass Violence: Rethinking
Transitional Justice, 109 AFR. AFF. 409 (2010).
4 LOCALIZING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: INTERVENTIONS AND PRIORITIES AFTER MASS VIOLENCE, supra
note 3, at 4.
5 See Timothy Donais, Haiti and the Dilemmas of Local Ownership, 64 INT’L. J. 753, 765 (2008–2009).
6 See Andrea Talentino, Perceptions of Peacebuilding: The Dynamic of Imposer and Imposed Upon, 8
INT’L STUDIES REV. 152, 153 (2007).
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global and the local is not an option, but a profoundly pragmatic imperative.7
Yet despite the acknowledged centrality of the local, concepts like local
ownership remain vague and poorly understood, being marshaled in different
ways by different actors for different ends,8 often being associated more with
aspirational rhetoric than concrete policy reality.9 Moreover, in the transitional
justice context—a context permeated with international normative frameworks,
institutions, donors, and technocratic expertise—the odds are often stacked
against giving primacy to the local in a meaningful sense.10 It is perhaps,
therefore, unsurprising that transitional justice interventions have been and
continue to be a frequent locus of tensions between the global and the local.11
Examined more deeply, the seeming consensus about the importance of the
local masks a profound ambivalence.12 Building upon local ownership,
priorities, practices, and values is often recognized as among the keys to the
success in transitional justice interventions,13 and yet local practices and
solutions can also lead to stark clashes with international human rights
standards.14 The appeal to the local can also be used by local elites to reinforce

7

See Report of the Secretary General, supra note 1, at para. 7 (“The imperative of national ownership is
a central theme of the present report.”).
8 See Daniel Bendix & Ruth Stanley, Deconstructing Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform: A
Review of the Literature, 17 AFR. SEC. REV. 93, 101 (2010).
9 See Simon Chesterman, Ownership in Theory and in Practice: Transfer of Authority in U.N.
Statebuilding Operations, 1 J. INTERVENTION & STATEBUILDING 3, 9 (2007) (noting that in the fields of postconflict reconstruction and development, ownership “has frequently been of more rhetorical significance than
anything else.”); Timothy Donais, Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in PostConflict Peacebuilding Processes, 34 PEACE & CHANGE 3, 5 (2009) (observing that in the broader field of
peacebuilding, “local ownership has rarely moved beyond the level of rhetoric”).
10 See Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Designing Bespoke Transitional Justice: A Pluralist Process Approach, 32
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 21 (2010) (“In transitional justice mechanisms to date, the international justice proponents’
concerns have generally been paramount, perhaps because they often provide much of the funding and
technical support for transitional justice mechanisms in the developing world.”).
11 See TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: GLOBAL MECHANISMS AND LOCAL REALITIES AFTER GENOCIDE AND
MASS VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 9 (“[T]ransitional justice mechanisms almost always have unexpected
outcomes that emerge out of ‘frictions’ between . . . global mechanisms and local realities.”).
12 See OLIVER RICHMOND, A POST-LIBERAL PEACE 152–54 (2011).
13 In an oft-cited comment on the topic, Kofi Annan noted that “no rule of law reform, justice
reconstruction, or transitional justice initiative imposed from the outside can hope to be successful or
sustainable.” The Rule of Law, supra note 2, at para. 17. Leopold von Carlowitz has observed that while
policy-makers, academics and practitioners generally agree with this principle, local ownership has
nevertheless proven difficult to operationalize in practice. Local Ownership in Practice: Justice System Reform
in Kosovo and Liberia 1 (Geneva Ctr. for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Occasional Paper No. 23,
March 2011).
14 See Peter Uvin, Difficult Choices in the New Post-Conflict Agenda: The International Community in
Rwanda After the Genocide, 22 THIRD WORLD Q. 177, 185–86 (2001) (“[W]hen internal or local solutions
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oppressive power structures, some of which may have led to the conflict in the
first place.15 For these and others reasons, there is a deep distrust of local
agency in the post-conflict context.16 Ultimately, the dilemmas of the local
therefore reflect a clash of normative commitments: between liberal
internationalism and international human rights on the one hand, and principles
of local sovereignty and autonomy on the other.17 The result of this
ambivalence, as played out through global-local power disparities, has
typically been accommodation of the local to the extent of conformity with the
global, co-option and not co-existence.18
Conflicting commitments call for a complicated balancing act. In some
contexts, too much local may be as problematic as too much global.19 While it
may be an all-but-impossible needle to thread,20 finding the right balance
between global and local agency, priorities, practices, and values stands out as
one of the key policy challenges of 21st century transitional justice.21 To this
end, this Article seeks to analyze and deconstruct the concept of the local in the
transitional justice context, exploring its promises and pitfalls. In doing so, I
attempt to make three key points.

emerge, they often take forms that do not conform to Western ethnical ideals or international legal
principles.”).
15 See Patricia Lundy, Paradoxes and Challenges of Transitional Justice at the “Local” Level: Historical
Enquiries in Northern Ireland, 6 CONTEMP. SOCIAL SCI. 89, 93 (2011) (reviewing arguments in the literature
that “transitional justice can be used by elites for a variety of purposes and to serve or conceal other very
different political agendas.”).
16 Florian Kuhn, The Peace Prefix: Ambiguities of the Word Peace, 19 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 396, 402
(2012).
17 See Donais, supra note 5, at 755–56. Global frictions arise in part due to a clash between universalism
and particularism—a dynamic at the heart of the cultural relativism debate in human rights. Yet it is important
to note here that values like participation, inclusion, and local agency are themselves often held out as
universal values intended to trump others, and at times are even as a shield against local or traditional practices
that might discriminate or otherwise fail to be fully inclusive. Thus, the clash of normative commitments I
speak of here is much more complex than frictions between a cosmopolitan liberalism and vigorous localism,
and could also be thought of a tension between different (purportedly universal) liberal commitments.
18 See Stephanie Vieille, Transitional Justice: A Colonizing Field?, 4 AMSTERDAM L.F. 58, 66 (2012).
19 See Donais, supra note 9, at 21.
20 See ROLAND PARIS & TIMOTHY SISK, MANAGING CONTRADICTIONS: THE INHERENT DILEMMAS OF
POSTWAR STATEBUILDING 5 (International Peace Academy, 2007) (suggesting that insofar as the dilemmas of
postwar statebuilding stem from “compelling but mutually conflicting imperatives,” they may prove
unresolvable).
21 I have elsewhere outlined this and other key dilemmas that characterize what I call “fourth generation
transitional justice.” See generally Dustin Sharp, Interrogating the Peripheries: The Preoccupations of Fourth
Generation Transitional Justice, 26 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 149, 152 (2013).
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First, a better understanding of the role of the local in transitional justice
discourse and practice requires that we think carefully about why transitional
justice should have so often become the locus for such vivid global-local
tensions in the first place. While cautioning against unduly rigid notions of
path dependency, I offer the historical and ideological origins of transitional
justice in Western liberalism and legalism as one partial explanation for the
global-local “friction” experienced today.22 I also sketch the contours of
several decades of transitional justice practice to highlight the continued
relevance of those origins.
Second, because concepts like local ownership present a loose and often
confusing theme in academic and policy discourse that subsumes a wide range
of critiques and concerns, understanding global-local dilemmas requires one to
unpack the concept, distinguishing concerns about actual control (agency,
decision making, funding), process (bottom-up, participatory, homegrown),
and substance (values, practices, priorities), even if those concerns are in
practice highly related. Given the rise of transitional justice interventions in
recent decades, tensions and conflict between global and local will inevitably
continue for the foreseeable future. At the same time, approaches to postconflict justice that take into account the need for a better global-local balance
along the multiple axes of local ownership (control, process, and substance)
may help to generate new and innovative approaches to trying to achieve peace
with justice in the wake of mass atrocity that take us beyond the increasingly
rote transitional justice “toolbox.”23
Finally, I observe that breaking down concepts like local ownership tends
to destabilize, deconstructing simple binary notions of global and local. In
reality, transitional justice processes typically involve complicated interplay
between multiple varied levels, resulting in a dialectic process where global
and local are transformed by their encounter with each other.24 This has led
22 As Millar et al. have noted, the “friction” concept helps to stress the unexpected, unintended, and
extremely complex nature of what happens when global meets local. See Gearoid Millar, Jaïr Van Der Lijn, &
Willemijn Verkoren, Peacebuilding Plans and Local Reconfigurations: Frictions between Imported Processes
and Indigenous Practices, 20 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 137, 139 (2013).
23 The phrase “transitional justice toolbox” refers to the mechanisms and interventions most associated
with the field: prosecutions, truth telling, reparations, vetting and dismissals, institutional reform, etc. The
toolbox metaphor is increasingly critiqued as suggesting a set, one-size-fits-all template ignorant of context,
and because the tool idea implies that transitional justice interventions are somehow neutral, acultural, and
apolitical. Lieselotte Viaene & Eva Brems, Transitional Justice and Cultural Contexts: Learning from the
Universality Debate, 28 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 199, 200 (2010).
24 See Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism and Transnational Culture: The Ka Ho’okolokolonui Kanaka
Maoli Tribunal, Hawai’i, 1993, in HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURE & CONTEST: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
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some scholars to question the value of the concept of the local, arguing instead
for more complicated notions of “glocality,” “translocality,” and “local and
larger local.”25 Yet as an ideal, the concept of the local continues to provide an
important counterweight to the centralizing and universalizing tendencies of
transitional justice and liberal international peacebuilding more generally.
Concepts of local and global therefore retain utility for purposes of both
analysis and policymaking, even if they do not accurately describe the full
complexity of transitional justice processes.
This Article consists of four parts. In Part I, I examine the ideological and
historical origins of the field of transitional justice, with a view to how these
origins have shaped some of the boundaries, tensions, and dilemmas of field.
In Part II, I discuss some of the frequent critiques of mainstream transitional
justice practice, particularly the idea that it is largely a top-down and statecentric enterprise that pays insufficient attention to questions of local
ownership, agency, priorities, practices, and values. In Part III, I examine some
of the promises and pitfalls of greater engagement with the local in matters of
transitional justice. In Part IV, I argue for the need to break down concepts of
local ownership as a means of striking a better global-local balance.
I. THE HISTORICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Transitional justice can be conceived of as a set of moral, legal, and
political dilemmas involving how best to respond to mass atrocities and other
forms of profound injustice in the wake of conflict or in times of political
transition.26 It is often defined in part by reference to a set of practices—
including prosecutions, truth-seeking, vetting and dismissals, reparations, and
institutional reform—now associated with responses to widespread human

30 (Richard Wilson ed., 1997) (“[H]uman rights is an open text, capable of appropriation and redefinition.”);
Sally Engle Merry, Global Human Rights and Local Social Movements in a Legally Plural World, 12 CAN. J.
L. & SOC. 247, 249 (1997) (“[G]lobal rights discourses are appropriated in local communities and . . . are
themselves constructed out of local struggles.”).
25 See Lundy, supra note 15, at 93 (reviewing perspectives that seek to move beyond the “stark and
mutually exclusive binary oppositions of local and ‘global’ that tend to dominate transitional justice
literature.”); Bruce Mazlish, The Global and the Local, 53 CURRENT SOCIOLOGY 93, 99 (2005) (discussing the
idea of “local” and “larger local.”).
26 Sriram, supra note 2, at 582–83. See Rosemary Nagy, Transitional Justice as a Global Project:
Critical Reflections, 29 THIRD WORLD Q. 275, 277–78 (2008) for a review of how definitions of transitional
justice have evolved over time. See also Paige Arthur, How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A
Conceptual History of Transitional Justice, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 321, 329–33 (2009) (tracing the history of the use
of the term “transitional justice.”).
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rights violations.27 In the last three decades, these practices have become
increasingly widespread. Priscilla Hayner, for example, has documented the
existence of some 40 modern-day truth commissions.28 Kathryn Sikkink has
demonstrated an increasing crescendo of human rights prosecutions taking
place at national and international levels leading, she argues, to the emergence
of a new global norm of accountability, at least for certain harms.29 In a
relatively brief span of history, therefore, transitional justice has in a sense
gone mainstream, with the question no longer being whether there will be
some kind of transitional justice, but what particular interventions will be
deployed, and what their scope and sequencing might look like.30 Though it
continues to be shaped by the broader field of international human rights,
transitional justice has emerged as its own field of theory, policy, and practice,
with dedicated NGOs, job descriptions, academic journals, and itinerant expert
consultants.31
Practices now associated with what we call transitional justice can be
traced back millennia,32 yet the origins of the modern field have firm roots in
the 1980s and 90s and the attempts of nascent democracies during the so-called
“third-wave” of democratic transitions33 to grapple with historical legacies of

27 According to a famous U.N. definition, “[transitional justice comprises] the full range of processes and
mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in
order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and
non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement (or none at all) and individual
prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof.”
The Rule of Law, supra note 1, at para. 8.
28 PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF
TRUTH COMMISSIONS 256–62 (2011).
29 See KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING
WORLD POLITICS 21 fig. 1.1 (2011).
30 See Nagy, supra note 26, at 276. See also Kieran McEvoy, Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker
Understanding of Transitional Justice, 34 J.L. & SOC’Y 411, 412 (2007).
31 See Laura Arriaza & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Social Reconstruction as Local Process, 2 INT’L J.
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 152, 152 (2008) (“A whole agenda—and a whole set of institutions and professionals—
has emerged to implement ‘transitional justice’ interventions . . . .”); Christine Bell, Transitional Justice,
Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field,’ 3 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 5, 7 (2009)
(arguing that transitional justice emerged as a distinct field sometime after 2000).
32 See generally JON ELSTER, CLOSING THE BOOKS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
(2004) (reviewing historic practices now associated with the modern field of transitional justice).
33 The “third wave” is a term used by political scientist Samuel Huntington to describe a period of global
democratization beginning in the mid-1970s that touched more than sixty countries in Europe, Latin America,
Asia, and Africa. See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991).
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repression and widespread human rights abuses.34 Born out of the euphoria of
the immediate post Cold-War era, an era pregnant with the rhetoric of Francis
Fukuyama’s “end of history,”35 transitional justice was shaped not just by a
preoccupation with accountability for past human rights violations, but by the
notion that grappling with the legacies of the past would also help to facilitate
a democratic political transition.36 Implicit in these twin impulses and the
ideology of the era was a sort of teleological or “stage-theory” view of
history.37 As part of this narrative, transitional justice mechanisms become a
sort of secular right of passage symbolizing evolution38 as countries progress
from barbarism, communism, and authoritarianism to Western liberal
democracy. Thus, viewing transitional justice as an apolitical “toolbox,” a
notion implicit in U.N. and other definitions, fails to account for the important
historical and ideological underpinnings of the field.39 While transitional
justice is a dynamic and evolving field, these origins remain key to
understanding some of its modern conceptual boundaries, assumptions, and
blind spots, shaped as they have been by a particular faith in the ability of key
liberal goods, including the rule of law, democracy, legalism, and human
rights, to create peace.40
Origins also help to explain in part the dominance of certain disciplines,
approaches, and professional sensibilities in the field today. In the abstract, the
34 See Arthur, supra note 26, at 325–26. The definitive source that captures the thinking and spirit of the
period is Neil Kritz’s seminal three-volume work. See generally TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING
DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES (Neil Kritz ed., Washington: United States Institute of Peace,
1995).
35 See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).
36 Influential scholars from the period attempted to predict to what extent the scope of transitional justice
would be determined by a set of bargains between the various elite groups facilitating the democratic
transition, with more or less justice possible depending on the extent to which previous elites retained a grip on
the levers of power. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991), reprinted in I TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 65, 65–81
(Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995); GUILLERMO O’DONNELL & PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER, TRANSITIONS FROM
AUTHORITARIAN RULE: TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES (1986), reprinted in
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, 57 (Neil Kritz ed., 1995).
37 See TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: GLOBAL MECHANISMS AND LOCAL REALITIES AFTER GENOCIDE AND
MASS VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 6–7.
38 See Michael Rothberg, Progress, Progression, Procession: William Kentridge and the Narratology of
Transitional Justice, 20 NARRATIVE 2, 5 (2012).
39 To An-Na’im, these historical and ideological underpinnings include an implicit neocolonial logic that
places dominant conceptions of “transitional justice” within “the grand ‘modernizing’ mission of North
Atlantic societies.” See Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Editorial Note: From the Neocolonial “Transition” to
Indigenous Formations of Justice, 7 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 197 (2013).
40 Chandra Sriram, supra note 2, at 579. See generally McEvoy, supra note 30, at 411, for the dominance
of law and legalism in transitional justice.
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question of how best to respond to mass atrocities is one well-suited to a range
of disciplines, including philosophy, history, religion, anthropology, and
psychology, yet in practice the field has for the most part been dominated by
lawyers and political scientists.41 Given the dominance of lawyers in particular,
it is perhaps not surprising that mass atrocities have been largely analogized as
a form of mass crime,42 and that the tools that have been marshaled in response
have had a heavily legal character, often focusing more on retributive justice
via formal courts and tribunals rather than other forms of justice.43 This
“prosecution preference,” under which anything short of Western-style
courtroom justice is often seen as comprised justice, is seemingly hardwired
into the DNA of mainstream transitional justice.44 It has been and continues to
be persistent source of debate and global-local frictions.45 Though truth
commissions as a form of restorative justice are arguably an exception to the
historic emphasis on retributive responses to mass atrocities, it has been argued
that they are still fundamentally rooted in Western modes of truth telling and
traditions of public confession and may not be appropriate in cultures with a
different historical grounding.46 Other items routinely considered as among the
standard tools of transitional justice such as reparations, which could be
considered a limited form of distributive justice, have in practice been given
comparatively little emphasis and funding in many transitional processes.47

41

See Arthur, supra note 26, at 333.
Miriam J. Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding
Transitional Justice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39, 94–97 (2002).
43 Rama Mani stands as an early exception to this trend, arguing for a more balanced approach to postconflict reconstruction that would include three dimensions of justice: retributive, rectificatory, and
distributive. See RAMA MANI, BEYOND RETRIBUTION: SEEKING JUSTICE IN THE SHADOWS OF WAR 5 (2002).
44 Aukerman, supra note 42, at 39–44 (describing the “prosecution preference”).
45 The prosecution preference can be seen in debates that raged in the late 1990s concerning whether a
truth commission alone could constitute an adequate form of justice. See, e.g, Reed Brody, Justice: The First
Casualty of Truth?, NATION, Apr. 30, 2001 (arguing that truth commissions can serve as “a soft option for
avoiding justice.”) More recently, one can look to controversies sparked by ICC indictments of leaders of the
Lord’s Resistance Army rebel group in Uganda where some members of the Acholi community in Northern
Uganda would prefer to forgo prosecutions in favor of Mato Oput, a local ritual that emphasizes reconciliation
and reintegration rather than simple retribution. Adam Branch, Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics of ICC
Intervention, 21 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 179, 191–92 (2007).
46 See Rosalind Shaw, United States Institute of Peace Special Report 130, Rethinking Truth and
Reconciliation Commissions: Lessons from Sierra Leone 4 (2005); see also Tim Kelsall, Truth, Lies, Ritual:
Preliminary Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 361
(2005).
47 See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Reparations in the Aftermath of Repression and Mass Violence, in MY
NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY 121 (Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein eds., 2004) (noting that “[o]utside the context
of the Second World War, examples of large-scale reparations programs become scarcer.”).
42
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As a thought experiment, Arthur observes, one might consider the possible
orientation of theory and praxis if the intellectual origins of transitional justice
had been rooted in paradigmatic transitions to socialism and the dominant
disciplines had been history and developmental economics.48 While it is
impossible to say for sure, it seems likely that the perceived dilemmas and
preoccupations, together with the tools marshaled to address them would look
considerably different. As an example, one could note the historic
preoccupation of transitional justice with civil and political rights rather than
economic and social rights, with acts of egregious physical violence such as
murder, torture, and rape, rather than equally devastating acts and policies of
economic and structural violence.49 Greater attention to questions of
distributive justice in transition—something that might have come more
naturally if the field had different historical, ideological, and professional
grounding—might well have entailed a focus on prosecutions for corruption
and other economic crimes, together with a push for policies involving
redistributive taxation or land tenure reform in the wake of conflict. Yet as the
field has evolved, these issues have been largely pushed to the margins.50 Thus,
the Western liberal roots of transitional justice together with the professional
orientations of those first drawn to the field helped to shape conceptions of
both problems and solutions, circumscribing and stunting the nature of what

48

See Arthur, supra note 26, at 359 (2009).
There is a growing literature examining the extent to which transitional justice can and should grapple
with economic and social rights and questions of distributive justice more generally. See, e.g, JUSTICE AND
ECONOMIC VIOLENCE IN TRANSITION (Dustin N. Sharp ed., 2014); RETHINKING TRANSITIONS: EQUALITY AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN SOCIETIES EMERGING FROM CONFLICT (Gaby Oré Aguila & Felipe Gómez Isa eds., 2011);
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IN TRANSITIONS (Morten Bergsmo et al. eds., 2010); TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND
DEVELOPMENT: MAKING CONNECTIONS (Roger Duthie & Pablo de Grieff eds., 2009); Louise Arbour,
Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 4 (2007). The
importance of greater engagement questions of economic justice has also been recognized by the UN. See, e.g.,
U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies,
para. 24, U.N. Doc. S/2011/634 (Oct. 12, 2011) (observing “growing recognition that truth commissions
should also address the economic, social and cultural rights dimensions of conflict to enhance long-term peace
and security”); U.N. Secretary-General, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Approach to
Transitional Justice para. 9 (Mar. 2010), http://www.unrol.org/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.
pdf (“Successful strategic approaches to transitional justice necessitate taking account of the root causes of
conflict or repressive rule, and must seek to address the related violations of all rights, including economic,
social, and cultural rights”).
50 See generally Zinaida Miller, Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the ‘Economic’ in Transitional
Justice, 2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 266 (2008).
49
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counts as an injustice, who counts as a victim, as well as the nature of and
emphasis within the “toolbox” itself. 51
While the historical and ideological origins of transitional justice may have
predisposed the field to privilege certain forms of harm and certain ways of
responding to those harms, it can be argued that the field’s roots in Western
liberalism do not necessarily dictate internationally imposed solutions, “topdown” responses, or the more general marginalization of the local that has
featured in many transitional justice interventions over time.52 At the same
time, the historic association between transitional justice and largely Western
and legalistic responses to mass atrocity, when coupled with the field’s
grounding in international law and international human rights more generally,
has served to privilege international institutions, norms, practices, knowledge,
and expertise.53 The early dominance of lawyers and legalism may also help to
explain a tendency to view social change as a function of elite bargaining and
top-down legal-institutional reforms.54 The result is an emphasis on a
constrained yet institutionally demanding understanding of transitional justice
that some have argued is not consistent with the quality and capacity of state
institutions in many post-conflict countries, to say nothing of cultural
congruence.55
Against this backdrop, the felt need for prosecutions and truth commissions
“in conformity with . . . international standards”56 often leads to the
involvement of international donors, NGOs, and experts, placing a further
thumb on the scales favoring the primacy of the global rather than the local.
Indigenous or homespun solutions come to appear rough around the edges,
second-best approaches to questions of how to do justice in times of
51 For example, under the South African TRC Act, a “victim” was limited to individuals who had
suffered “gross violation[s] of human rights . . . defined as . . . killing, abduction, torture, or severe illtreatment.” The poverty, racism, and structural violence of the Apartheid system itself where thereby excluded.
Roger Duthie & Pablo de Greiff, Repairing the Past: Reparations for Victims of Human Rights Violations, in
HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 8 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006).
52 Roland Paris made this point with respect to similar critiques that have been leveled against the
broader field of post-conflict peacebuilding. See Roland Paris, Saving Liberal Peacebuilding, 36 REV. OF INT’L
STUD. 337, 363 (2010). I outline these critiques in more detail in Part II.
53 See generally Dustin N. Sharp, Interrogating the Peripheries; The Preoccupations of Fourth
Generation Transitional Justice, 26 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 149, 150 (2013).
54 See Sandra Rubli, Transitional Justice: Justice by Bureaucratic Means? 11 (Swiss Peace, Working
Paper No. 4, 2012).
55 See Lydiah Bosire, Overpromised, Underdelivered: Transitional Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa, 5 SUR
INT’L J. ON HUM. RTS. 71, 72 (2006).
56 The Rule of Law, supra note 1, at para. 36.
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transition.57 Mirroring the savages-victims-saviors paradigm at the heart of
some human rights advocacy, these dynamics produce a situation where the
locals (savages) need to be assisted by international experts and institutions
(saviors)—not just from the abuses they have committed against victims
during the conflict, but from the “mistakes” locals would make in attempting to
devise their own post-conflict solutions as well.58 Internationally constructed
categories of “perpetrator” and “victim” are essential to justifying such
interventions. (Who, after all, will defend the rights of “victims” if not
members of the “international community?”)59 The international assistance
offered in such a context is projected as apolitical and technocratic, yet it
carries heavy implications for the distribution of power (political, legal, social,
etc.) in the post-conflict context.60
Of course, origins are not destiny, and the biases and blind spots of the
early years of transitional justice need not necessarily be those of today. Thus,
in seeking to understand contemporary challenges, unduly rigid notions of path
dependency must be avoided. There are signs of limited but increasing
openness to more diverse and culturally-grounded approaches to justice and a
growing reconsideration of the need to address questions of economic justice.61
The field is also increasingly being shaped by perspectives from disciplines
other than law and political science. Yet it is also true that once sets of
practices and assumptions come to dominate a field, more than superficial
change can prove difficult and slow going. As James Cavallaro and Sebastián
Albuja have argued, the early years of transitional justice helped to establish a

57 See An-Na’im, supra note 39, at 197 (observing that “preference is given to a standard of justice that is
mandated by the international community over indigenous or ‘traditional’ practices.”).
58 See generally Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42
HARV. INT’L L. J. 201 (2001).
59 For a useful deconstruction of the problematic term “international community,” see generally Berit
Bliesemann de Guevara & Florian Kuhn, ‘The International Community Needs to Act’: Loose Use and Empty
Signaling of a Hackneyed Concept, 18 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 135 (2011).
60 See Patricia Lundy & Mark McGovern, Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice from the
Bottom Up, 35 J.L. & SOC’Y 265, 276–77 (2008) (noting that “wider geo-political and economic interests too
often shape what tend to be represented as politically and economically neutral post-conflict and transitional
justice initiatives”); Bronwyn Anne Leebaw, The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice, 30 HUM. RTS.
Q. 95, 98–106 (2008) (arguing that a superficial consensus as to the goals of transitional justice can serve to
mask a deeper level of politicization and debate, and that assessment of the tensions, trade-offs, and dilemmas
associated with transitional justice has become difficult to the extent that they have been conceptualized in
apolitical terms); Sriram, supra note 2, at 587–88 (discussing the ways in which post-conflict institutional
reform strategies relating to the judiciary, constitution, and security forces may be seen by key protagonists as
permanently cementing new power arrangements and therefore not as neutral or apolitical processes).
61 See Sharp, supra note 53, at 139.
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“dominant script” that has gone on to be replicated irrespective of how suited it
has been to some new contexts.62
Over time, the democratic transitions paradigm in which the field was
originally grounded has become less explicit, and transitional justice is
increasingly associated with the much broader field of post-conflict
peacebuilding.63 One could ask whether this newfound association will help to
break through the conceptual boundaries and dominant scripts that have
developed over time.64 However, as many have noted, the field of international
post-conflict peacebuilding is itself largely rooted in the belief that free
markets and Western liberal democracies are the surest path to peace.65 As I
have argued elsewhere, the critiques of what has become known as “liberal
international peacebuilding” share much in common with the critiques of
transitional justice, including the idea that they both frequently involve topdown and state-centric interventions that serve to marginalize local ownership,
agency, priorities, practices, and values.66 There is reason to worry that the
concerns that have given rise to these parallel critiques will be made worse, not
better, by a greater association between transitional justice and post-conflict
peacebuilding.67 Thus, one should not expect global-local frictions in
62 Sebastián Albuja & James Cavallaro, The Lost Agenda: Economic Crimes and Truth Commissions in
Latin America and Beyond, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FROM BELOW, GRASSROOTS ACTIVISM AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR CHANGE 125 (Kieran McEvoy & Lorna McGregor eds., 2008). The problem of set templates
and formulaic paths is of course not unique to transitional justice, but has dogged the broader work of postconflict peacebuilding as well. See Ole Jacob Sending, Why Peacebuilders Fail to Secure Ownership and be
Sensitive to Context 7 (Norwegian Inst. of Int’l Aff., Working Paper No. 755, 2009). It is important to note,
however, that even established and dominant scripts can and do change (as evident in the growing work of
certain African truth commissions on questions of economic justice), even if it typically involves a very slow
and uneven process. See generally, Dustin N. Sharp, Economic Violence in the Practice of African Truth
Commissions and Beyond, in JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC VIOLENCE IN TRANSITION (Dustin N. Sharp ed., 2014).
63 Thus, for example, transitional justice practices are now associated with countries and regime changes
such as Rwanda that can hardly be considered democratic. See generally AFTER GENOCIDE: TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE, POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA AND BEYOND (Phil Clark &
Zachary D. Kaufman eds., 2009).
64 Many have questioned the utility of the transitions paradigm altogether. See, e.g., Moses Chrispus
Okello, Afterword: Elevating Transitional Local Justice or Crystallizing Global Governance?, in LOCALIZING
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: INTERVENTIONS AND PRIORITIES AFTER MASS VIOLENCE 275, 278–79 (Rosalind Shaw
& Lars Waldorf eds., 2010) (questing the “unintended consequences of assuming that we are all progressing
towards the same destination”); Harvey M. Weinstein et al., Stay the Hand of Justice: Whose Priorities Take
Priority?, in LOCALIZING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: INTERVENTIONS AND PRIORITIES AFTER MASS VIOLENCE 36,
36 (Rosalind Shaw & Lars Waldorf eds., 2010) (stating that “[i]t is time to reconsider whether the term
transitional justice accurately captures the dynamic processes unfolding on the ground”).
65 See generally ROLAND PARIS, AT WAR’S END (2004).
66 See generally Dustin N. Sharp, Beyond the Post-Conflict Checklist: Linking Peacebuilding and
Transitional Justice Through the Lens of Critique, 14 CHI. J. INT’L L. 165 (2013).
67 Id.
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transitional justice to disappear as the historical and ideological origins of the
field slip further below the surface. On the contrary, the lingering perception
that transitional justice and post-conflict peacebuilding more generally share a
common project to remake illiberal and imperfectly liberal states in the image
of Western liberal democracies68 contributes to the tendency of post-conflict
interventions with a strong international component to produce some of the
global-local frictions discussed in the following Part.69
II. CRITIQUES OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE PRACTICE VIS-À-VIS THE LOCAL
While the ideological and professional origins of transitional justice theory
and practice helped to shape the conceptual boundaries of the field and to set in
motion some of the global-local frictions experienced today, it would be too
simple to attribute everything to those origins. We must also look to several
decades of transitional justice practice to better understand the dilemmas of the
local. Transitional justice practice is not a monolith, and where trenchant
critiques have been raised there are always notable exceptions to the more
general trend.70 To be clear, much of the work of transitional justice—be it
national-level human rights prosecutions or locally initiated and driven
restorative justice practices—is carried out without significant tension with the
global.71 Yet a persistent critique of many transitional justice initiatives is that
they pay insufficient attention to questions of locality and have been distant
from the victims and the larger communities whom they were on some level
intended to serve. Examples here will be largely drawn from transitional
justice initiatives with a significant international component or where globallocal frictions have otherwise risen to the surface most palpably. International
prosecutions, in particular, have tended to set global-local frictions in sharpest

68

See Lundy & McGovern, supra note 60, 276–77.
As with development and transitional justice, there is a burgeoning peacebuilding literature analyzing
the dilemmas of the local. See, e.g., Oliver Richmond, The Romanticisation of the Local: Welfare, Culture,
and Peacebuilding, 44 INT’L SPECTATOR 149, 161–63 (2009); Roger Mac Ginty, Indigenous Peace-Making
Versus the Liberal Peace, 43 COOPERATION AND CONFLICT: J. NORDIC INT’L STUD. ASS’N 139 (2008); Donais,
supra note 9, at 3.
70 See Jenny Peterson, A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity: Accounting for Notions of Power, Politics
and Progress in Analyses of Aid-Driven Interfaces, 7 J. OF PEACEBUILDING AND DEV. 9, 12 (2012) (noting the
tendency of assessments of liberal interventions to homogenize).
71 At the same time, as I note in the following Part, great caution with categories of global and local is
warranted. What may look like a purely “local” effort or initiative may turn out to have been in part initiated
by internationals, and to have received international funding, framing, and technical assistance. Thus, in
practice, there is often a blurring of categories.
69
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relief, and will be examined in some detail before turning more briefly to the
work of truth commissions.72
In many ways, the paradigm for modern-day international tribunals can be
found in the Nuremburg International Military Tribunal (IMT), which was
established by the victorious allied powers shortly after the Second World War
in order to try senior Nazi leaders for aggression, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity.73 From the outset, the tribunal was dogged with criticism
that it exemplified a form of victor’s justice and made little attempt to secure
what we might today call local ownership, drawing both judges and
prosecutors from the ranks of the victors.74 Indeed, quite apart from a
preoccupation with such niceties, one of the chief policy debates in the lead up
to the creation of the tribunal was whether to summarily execute senior Nazi
leaders, with options ranging from 50 to 50,000 executions.75 The trial option
prevailed, however, and unlike some modern international tribunals, the IMT
was located in-country, in Nuremburg no less, which was the ceremonial
birthplace of the National Socialist (Nazi) party and site of annual propaganda
rallies. The choice of a trial, as opposed to executions, and a symbolic location
in Germany were intended to help generate a sense of defeat amongst the
vanquished (i.e., the locals), but also to serve the educational function of
conveying to ordinary Germans some sense of the scope of the atrocities
72 “International prosecutions” includes purely international tribunals such as the international criminal
tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Rwanda (ICTR), and the International Criminal Court (ICC), as
well as the so-called “hybrid” tribunals, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). Though one could
argue for a distinction between “international criminal justice” (limited primarily to international and hybrid
criminal tribunals) and the broader work of “transitional justice,” the fact remains that since Nuremburg
international tribunals have often been associated with transitional and post-conflict contexts, and they tend to
generate similar legal, political and moral dilemmas. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, arts. 4–5 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The International Criminal Court has
the potential to hear cases from a great variety of countries and therefore is not limited to addressing crimes in
post-conflict or transitional contexts; however, its work in places like Uganda and Côte d’Ivoire has become
central to post-conflict dynamics in both countries. Even when operating where there is no notable political
transition, the ICC has demonstrated a capacity to generate very sharp global-local frictions. See, e.g., Eric
Posner, The Absurd International Criminal Court, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2012, at A13. Thus, for the sole
purposes of analyzing global-local frictions, a sharp line between international criminal justice and transitional
justice need not be drawn.
73 For a fascinating account of the establishment of the Nuremburg tribunal and a recap of the debates
that it engendered, see GARY J. BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNALS 147–205 (2000).
74 With respect to the victor’s justice charge, Chief Justice Stone of the United States Supreme Court
famously called the trials a “high-grade lynching party” and a “sanctimonious fraud.” See Louise Arbour, The
Rule of Law and the Reach of Accountability, in THE RULE OF LAW 104 (Cheryl Saunders & Katherine Le Roy
eds., 2003).
75 GARY J. BASS, supra note 73, at 158–60.
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committed by the Nazis in their name.76 Although better than the alternatives
debated at the time, there can ultimately be little doubt that the Nuremburg
(and lesser known Tokyo) tribunals were an imposed justice and that the
ability of local constituencies to have meaningful input into the process was
limited to nonexistent.77
Even though the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals generated some
controversy, they helped spark an interest in the creation of a permanent
international criminal court.78 However, Cold War frictions soon made
consensus on the parameters of such an institution impossible.79 Nevertheless,
the Nuremberg model remains important because it was in some respects
resurrected in the mid-1990s with the creation of the ad hoc tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR).80 As the first major post-Cold
War experiments in international justice, both tribunals served as a lightning
rod for critiques and concerns relating to their engagement with the local.
Neither tribunal was fully supported by the national governments most
concerned, and the tribunals themselves were set up far from the victim
communities and publics on whose behalf, at least in part, they ostensibly
worked.81 Focusing on this sense of almost imperial remoteness, one early
critic argued that the tribunals “orbit in space, suspended from political reality
and removed from both the individual and national psyches of the victims as
well as the victors in those conflicts.”82

76 Beyond its symbolic value, Nuremburg was also chosen out of convenience since its Palace of Justice
was large and relatively undamaged by the war. See id. at 154 (noting President Roosevelt’s desire that “every
person in Germany should realize that this time Germany is a defeated nation” and speculating that the aspect
of the Nuremburg trials that may have most appealed to President Roosevelt was their educational value for
the local population in terms of conveying some of the truth of what was done during the war).
77 The majority of the defense counsel were German lawyers.
78 See John Dugard, Obstacles in the Way of an International Criminal Court, 56 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 329,
329 (1997) (noting “[t]he enthusiasm generated by Nuremberg and Tokyo for a permanent court”).
79 Between 1949 and 1954, the International Law Commission prepared several draft statutes that would
have led to the creation of a permanent international criminal court, but they were eventually shelved. See id.
80 See id. at 330.
81 The ICTY is located in The Hague, the Netherlands, far from the killing fields of Bosnia. The ICTR is
located in Arusha, Tanzania. Unlike the ICTY, the Rwandan government actually asked the Security Council
to create a tribunal, though it eventually cast the sole dissenting vote against the tribunal due to its location
outside of Rwanda, its primacy over Rwandan courts, and its lack of ability to impose the death penalty. Its
relations with the tribunal have ranged from coolness to hostility. See Alison Des Forges & Timothy Longman,
Legal Responses to Genocide in Rwanda, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE
AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 49, 54 (Eric Stover & Harvey Weinstein eds., 2004).
82 Makau Mutua, Never Again: Questioning the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, 11 TEMP. INT’L &
COMP. L.J. 167, 168 (1997).
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Perhaps predictably, the distanced and isolated nature of the tribunals led to
a lack of understanding of their work in both regions.83 Nationals of the
affected states were excluded from holding high-level positions on the
tribunals, further eroding a sense of ownership, and this led to a situation
where those doing the prosecuting and judging not only did not share the
traditions of the victims and alleged perpetrators, but in many cases were
almost totally ignorant about local history and culture.84 Despite expectations
that the tribunals would contribute to peace in the respective regions, it has
been argued that, in the case of the ICTY, the tribunal’s architects “gave little
thought to how it would relate to those most affected by the carnage”
ultimately threatening “the legitimacy of the court in the eyes of the society it
was trying to help.”85 Given the misunderstandings and lack of local
legitimacy, it is perhaps not surprising that some local constituencies have
come to see the work of the ICTY as a form of victor’s justice.86 While the
ICTR has provoked less overt hostility among ordinary Rwandans, many see it
as a largely useless affair conducted by the international community for the
international community.87
Mounting criticism of the ad hoc tribunals eventually led to the creation of
“community outreach” units. Such outreach and other community-centered
objectives have always been ancillary to the primary task of securing
convictions, and turning around people’s perceptions of the tribunals’ work has

83

See Laurel Fletcher & Harvey Weinstein, A World Unto Itself? The Application of International
Justice in the Former Yugoslavia, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE
AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 29, 29 (Eric Stover & Harvey Weinstein eds., 2004); Timothy Longman et
al., Connecting Justice to Human Experience: Attitudes Toward Accountability and Reconciliation in Rwanda,
in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 206, 206
(Eric Stover & Harvey Weinstein eds., 2004).
84 See Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 83, at 32; Des Forges & Longman, supra note 81, at 53 (noting
that in the early years of the ICTR, “[v]irtually none of the tribunals staff . . . knew anything about the history
and culture of Rwanda.”).
85 See id. at 32–33.
86 See id. at 40. With regards to the ICTR, the tribunal’s failure to prosecute crimes committed by the
Rwandan Patriotic Front has been seen by some as a form of victor’s justice. Int’l Crisis Grp. [ICG],
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Justice Delayed, at iii, ICG Africa Report N. 30 (June 7, 2001)
[hereinafter ICG Report].
87 ICG Report, supra note 86, at iii; see also Bert Ingeleare, The Gacaca courts in Rwanda, in
TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT: LEARNING FROM AFRICAN
EXPERIENCES 25, 31–45 (Luc Huyse & Mark Salter eds., 2008) (arguing that “[o]n Rwandan soil, the
[International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda] is portrayed and thus perceived as an instance of the Western
way of doing justice—highly inefficient, time-consuming, expensive and not adapted to Rwandan custom.”).
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proved to be a tall order.88 Writing in 2003, some five years after the creation
of the ICTR’s outreach program, Uvin and Mironko note that “[t]he main
sentiment in Rwanda regarding the ICTR may well be massive ignorance:
ordinary people know or understand next to nothing about the tribunal’s work,
proceedings, or results.”89 These are disappointing results, and it is hard to see
how a tribunal could contribute to broader efforts at reconciliation and postconflict peacebuilding when so many are not familiar with its work in the first
place.90 Lack of information likely also contributes to distortions promoted by
those opposed to the work of the tribunals, including elites and former
perpetrators attempting to sway public opinion against them.91
Much has therefore been said about the potential for more and better
outreach.92 However, even a well staffed, well funded, and brilliantly executed
outreach program can only do so much to bridge the substantial gap that can
exist between local populations and international justice efforts. Outreach
alone does little to address the marginalization of local agency, priorities,
values, and practice in the set up and operation of the tribunals and carries with
it a subtext of locals as passive recipients of international justice discourse and
practice. Outreach does not, for example, change the fact that Rwandans are
being judged outside of Rwanda by non-Rwandans using Western-style
judicial practices that not all Rwandans agree with or understand. Further, this
judgment takes place in an international tribunal that has primacy over national
proceedings within Rwanda, the very creation of which was opposed by the
88 See David Cohen, “Hybrid” Justice in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia: “Lessons Learned”
and Prospects for the Future, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 5–6 (2007); Varda Hussain, Sustaining Judicial Rescues:
The Role of Judicial Outreach and Capacity-Building Efforts in War Crimes Tribunals, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 547,
551 (2005); see also Victor Peskin, Courting Rwanda: The Promises and Pitfalls of the ICTR Outreach
Programme, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 950, 950–61 (2005).
89 Peter Uvin & Charles Mironko, Western and Local Approaches to Justice in Rwanda, 9 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 219, 221 (2003). This ICTR is not alone in this regard. Though hailed as modestly innovative, it
has been argued that the Outreach Section of the Special Court for Sierra Leone “largely failed in its primary
goal of educating Sierra Leoneans about the Special Court.” Stuart Ford, How Special is the Special Court’s
Outreach Section?, in THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY: THE IMPACT FOR AFRICA AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Charles Jalloh ed., 2014).
90 The preamble to the United Nations Security Council resolution establishing the ICTR provides that
“the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law, would enable
this aim [bringing effective justice] to be achieved and would contribute to the process of national
reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace.” S.C. Res. 955, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(Nov. 8, 1994).
91 See Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 83, at 32.
92 See, e.g., Ramji-Nogales, supra note 10, at 29–38; Etelle R. Higonnet, Restructuring Hybrid Courts:
Local Empowerment and National Criminal Justice Reform, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L COMP. L. 347, 347, 363–76,
387–88, 410–13, 425 (2006).
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Rwandan government in the first place.93 It also does not change the fact that
defendants found guilty by the ICTR will serve their sentences outside of
Rwanda in conditions far superior to that of anyone found guilty on similar
charges by Rwanda’s national courts.94 Outreach does not change the fact that,
at the end of the day, “neither the Rwandan government nor the international
community has solicited the views of the Rwandan population” regarding how
justice should best be achieved in post-genocide Rwanda.95 Thus, while being
better informed about a distant process is better than being wholly ignorant, it
is still very different than having a meaningful say about the setup and
implementation of justice processes that might deeply affect a community.
Of course, one could debate to what extent international tribunals should
spend valuable time and resources trying to be more communicative, to be
more connected to local communities, and to pursue wider social aims beyond
delivering judgments.96 There may indeed be cause to be modest in our
expectations for what a tribunal can meaningfully accomplish given historic
resource limitations and established bureaucratic incentives and priorities.97
Yet one danger in not doing a better job engaging in questions of locality than
the ICTY and ICTR is a potential loss of legitimacy and a sense that the
tribunals are little more than a “theoretical exercise in developing international
humanitarian law.”98 While scrupulously run proceedings and eventual
convictions are unquestionably important, a process viewed by locals with
indifference (at best) to hostility (at worst) would seem to represent a lost
opportunity when it comes to deeper projects of accountability and the rule of
law associated with long-term peacebuilding.
Following the many challenges, successes, and failures of the ad-hoc
tribunals, a new international tribunal model emerged, that of the so-called
“hybrid” or “mixed” tribunals of Sierra Leone (Special Court for Sierra
93 See infra text accompanying note 81 (discussing the reasons for the Rwandan government’s opposition
to the creation of the tribunal).
94 The disparate treatment of defendants and those convicted has been a source of some resentment in
Rwanda as it gives the impression that the “big fish” who orchestrated the genocide are being given better
treatment than “rank-and-file” offenders. See Jennie E. Burnet, The Injustice of Local Justice: Truth,
Reconciliation, and Revenge in Rwanda, 3 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 173, 175 (2008).
95 Longman, supra note 83, at 206.
96 See, e.g., Marlies Glasius, Do International Criminal Courts Require Democratic Legitimacy?, 23
EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 43 (2012) (reviewing critiques of international courts).
97 See Padraig McAuliffe, Hybrid Tribunals at Ten: How International Criminal Justice’s Golden Child
Became an Orphan, 7 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 1, 64 (2011) (arguing that without a significant re-orientation of
the priorities of international criminal justice policymakers, expectations for tribunals should be lowered).
98 See Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 83, at 30.
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Leone), Kosovo (“Regulation 64” Panels in the Courts of Kosovo), East Timor
(the Serious Crimes Panels of the District Court of Dili), and Cambodia (the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia).99 Unlike the ICTY and
ICTR, hybrid tribunals are generally located in the country most affected by
the conflict, and are comprised of national and international judges and staff.100
This model was initially greeted with some enthusiasm, being thought to hold
the promise of greater local legitimacy, greater norm penetration at the local
level, and stronger ability for local capacity building—including strengthening
domestic judicial systems.101 In the literature, they are often presented as a sort
of evolution from and response to the failures and critiques of the ad-hoc
tribunals,102 representing a sort of middle ground that harnesses the power and
legitimacy of international law, remains connected to local expertise and
populations, while avoiding the staggering costs of purely international
prosecutions.103 Yet closer study of the creation of the various hybrid tribunals
reveals a process of quick decisions and tough compromises more than a
conscious process of experimentation as part of an effort to improve upon past
failures.104 It should also be noted that the exceptional cost of the ad-hoc
tribunals (which represented a full fifteen percent of the U.N. budget at the
time of the creation of the hybrid tribunals) made the possibility of creating
additional courts modeled on the ICTY and ICTR impossible as a practical
matter.105 Thus, the narrative of progress and institutional learning regarding
the best relationship between tribunals and the local may not be as
straightforward as once imagined.

99 A great deal has been written about the establishment, functioning, and failures of hybrid tribunals.
See, e.g., McAuliffe, supra note 97; Cohen, supra note 88, at 5–6; Higonnet, supra note 92, at 347.
100 There have been slight deviations from this norm. The trial of Charles Taylor before the Special Court
for Sierra Leone was held in The Hague, due primarily to fears about security. See generally Giulia Bigi, The
Decision of the Special Court for Sierra Leone to Conduct the Charles Taylor Trial in The Hague, 6 THE LAW
AND PRAC. OF INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 303 (2007).
101 McAuliffe, supra note 97, at 10–22.
102 See Cohen, supra note 88, at 1; Olga Martin-Ortega & Johanna Herman, Hybrid Tribunals: Interaction
and Resistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Cambodia, in HYBRID FORMS OF PEACE: FROM EVERYDAY
AGENCY TO POST-LIBERALISM 73 (Oliver Richmond & Audra Mitchell eds., 2012).
103 Higonnet, supra note 92, at 349 (outlining the potential power of hybrid tribunals in theory if not
reality); Ellen Stensrud, New Dilemmas in Transitional Justice: Lessons from the Mixed Courts in Sierra
Leone and Cambodia, 46 J. PEACE RES. 5, 7 (2009) (arguing that “[t]he combination of international standards
through U.N. involvement and local ownership through physical proximity and national participation may
increase the legitimacy of these mechanisms”).
104 McAuliffe, supra note 97, at 23.
105 George Yacoubian, Evaluating the Efficacy of the International Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former
Yugoslavia: Implications for Criminology and International Criminal Law, 165 WORLD AFF. 133, 136 (2003).
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Over a decade after the enthusiasm that greeted the first hybrid tribunals,
evaluations of their success have become more circumspect. McAuliffe argues
that some of the hybrid tribunals were often more hybrid in principle than in
practice.106 That is, far from being paragons of shared or local ownership, in
the case of a number of the tribunals, “domestic authorities were largely
marginalized or disengaged” while internationals dominated the process.107
This may have resulted in part from ambiguity over allocation of responsibility
and in part out of a seeming reluctance by some national governments to share
blame and responsibility.108 Compounding matters, tribunals in Sierra Leone,
East Timor, and Cambodia have also been severely underfunded, particularly
when it comes to activities such as outreach.109
If the ad hoc tribunals orbited in space,110 the hybrid tribunals have been
described as a “spaceship phenomenon,” with the tribunals’ physical
headquarters a strange and alien hive of activity largely seen as an irrelevant
curiosity by the local population.111 In practice, some critics argue, far from
being the goldilocks solution some had hoped for that brings together the best
of the global and the local, hybrid tribunals may sometimes turn out to be the
worst of both worlds, joining the remoteness of purely international tribunals
like the ICTR and ICTY with the shoestring budgets and occasional lack of
rigor that can at times stymie purely local efforts.112 Thus, while hybrid
tribunals as a model continue to hold much promise,113 some have argued that
without a radical shift in priorities and funding, we may need to be modest in
our expectations as to what they can accomplish beyond the fairly
straightforward work of trying defendants and rendering judgments.114

106 See McAuliffe, supra note 97, at 36 (noting that the hybrid tribunals were “hybrid in form but never in
ethos.”); Higonnet, supra note 92, at 349.
107 McAuliffe, supra note 97, at 36.
108 See id. at 35 (2011); see also Cohen, supra note 88, at 36 (discussing challenges arising from unclear
or contested ownership).
109 Cohen, supra note 88, at 36.
110 Mutua, supra note 82, at 168.
111 TOM PERRIELLO & MARIEKE WIERDA, The Special Court for Sierra Leone Under Scrutiny,
PROSECUTIONS CASE STUDY SERIES, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, NEW YORK, 2
(2006) (defining the spaceship phenomenon as “a Court that is perceived as a curiosity and an anomaly with
little impact on citizens’ everyday lives.”).
112 See, e.g., Caitlin Reiger, Hybrid Attempts at Accountability for Serious Crimes in Timor Leste, in
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE 143–70 (Naomi
Roht-Arriaza & Javier Mariezcurrena eds., 2006).
113 Higonnet, supra note 92, at 349.
114 McAuliffe, supra note 97, at 53–65.
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Given that enthusiasm for hybrid tribunals has waned and additional ad hoc
tribunals modeled on the ICTR and ICTY seem unlikely for the foreseeable
future, the ability of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to better engage
with questions of locality and to avoid some of the failures of the past becomes
especially important.115 Yet as a model, the institution created by the Rome
Statute seems to harken back to Nuremburg and the ad hoc tribunals,
suggesting, even in the absence of any practice, that the potential to generate
significant global-local frictions would be high.116 Indeed, with a headquarters
far removed both physically and culturally from the conflicts and perpetrators
it has addressed, the ICC’s first decade of practice has been regularly
punctuated by what one could characterize as a clash between global and
local.117 In Uganda, for example, some members of Acholi constituencies in
the North have expressed a strong preference for using local reconciliation and
reintegration practices to address crimes committed by former members of the
Lord’s Resistance Army rather than the ICC’s retributive justice.118 Regarding
Kenya, a variety of African states and the African Union (AU) have attempted
to pressure the Court to drop charges against Kenyan President Uhuru
Kenyatta, with the AU chairman going so far as to accuse the ICC of being

115 This is not to deemphasize the importance of national-level or “domestic” human rights prosecutions.
Indeed, Kathryn Sikkink has shown that the worldwide crescendo of human rights prosecutions in recent
decades rests upon a bedrock of national trials. See SIKKINK, supra note 29, at 21.
116 See generally Rome Statute, supra note 72. One obvious but notable distinction between the ad hoc
tribunals and the ICC is that while the former were created by fiat of the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC), accession to the Rome Statute is voluntary, even if the UNSC retains the power to refer cases
involving non-state parties to the Court under Article 13(b). In addition, provisions in the Rome Statute
relating to victim access, participation, and compensation, as well as some flexibility as to where the court may
sit represent a distinct improvement compared to the ad hoc tribunals, at least in principle. For review of the
Court’s outreach work in practice, see Marlies Glasius, What is Global Justice and Who Decides? Civil Society
and Victim Responses to the International Criminal Court’s First Investigations, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 496, 509–20
(2009).
117 Thus far, all of the Court’s official investigations are in Africa: Central African Republic, Côte
d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Sudan (Darfur), and Uganda. See ICC Office of
the Prosecutor’s website, http://www.icc-cpi.int (follow “English;” then follow “Structure of the Court;” then
follow “Office of the Prosecutor”). Though it has yet to take advantage of it, it should be noted that a degree of
flexibility has been built into the Rome Statute, allowing the Court to sit in locations outside of The Hague.
See Rome Statute, supra note 72, art. 3 (While “[t]he seat of the Court shall be established at The Hague in the
Netherlands,” “[t]he Court may sit elsewhere, whenever it considers it desirable.”). Judges at the ICC have
recently suggested that it might be desirable to hold portions of a trial against Kenyan officials in either Kenya
or neighboring Tanzania. ICC Delays Cases of William Ruto and Laurent Gbagbo, BBC NEWS (June 3, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22762283.
118 See Tim Murithi, African Approaches to Building Peace and Social Solidarity, 6 AFR. J. ON CONFLICT
RES. 9, 23–27 (2006).
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racist for only prosecuting cases in Africa.119 Regarding Sudan, members of
the African Union voted to refuse cooperation with the indictment of Omar AlBachir.120 Taken together, “declining enthusiasm for the Court,” particularly in
Africa, constitutes a serious challenge to the future health and legitimacy of the
fledgling institution, highlighting the importance of taking questions of locality
seriously.121
It would be easy to write off some criticism of the ICC as a sort of
rearguard effort by autocratic leaders and regimes to preserve some of the
privileges and impunity associated with power. Indeed, as demonstrated in
Kenya, support for the work of the Court may at times be higher among
ordinary citizens than in segments of a self-interested political class, even if the
views of the former are eventually susceptible to elite manipulation.122 At the
same time, one should note that the possibility of having a former president or
senior official tried for human rights abuses in a foreign country, or before an
international tribunal, has almost always generated significant tensions and
feelings of ambivalence, from Augusto Pinochet, to Charles Taylor, to Laurent
Gbagbo today.123 Thus, one should expect that prosecutions of the type carried
out by the ICC will generate controversy even in the best of circumstances.
However, though important, overemphasis of these factors would serve to
ignore some of the deeper issues driving the global-local frictions that seem to
plague the Court’s work, issues stemming from the way global and local

119 ICC Delays Cases of William Ruto and Laurent Gbagbo, BBC NEWS (June 3, 2013), http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-africa-22762283; Jenny Vaughan and Aude Genet, Africa Closes Ranks to Condemn
“Racist” ICC on Kenya Cases, AFP (May 27, 2013). Perspectives among ordinary Kenyans are highly varied,
ranging from support for the ICC’s work in Kenya, to ambivalence, to opposition. See generally Thomas Obel
Hansen, Kenya’s Power-Sharing Arrangement and Its Implications for Transitional Justice, 17 INT’L J. OF
HUM. RTS. 307 (2013).
120 See African Union in Rift with Court, BBC NEWS (July 3, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
8133925.stm.
121 See William Schabas, The Banality of International Justice, 11 J. INT’L J. CRIM. JUST. 545 (2013).
122 See generally Hansen, supra note 119, at 307.
123 Consider in this regard the potential controversy if George W. Bush or Donald Rumsfeld were arrested
and put on trial outside of the United States. The possibility of similar scenarios helped spawn the American
Service-Members Protection Act of 2002, 22 U.S.C. § 7427, a federal law adopted “to protect United States
military personnel and other elected and appointed officials of the United States government against criminal
prosecution by an international criminal court to which the United States is not party.” It authorizes the
President to use “all means necessary and appropriate to bring about the release of any US or allied personnel
being detained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the request of the International Criminal Court.” Because
“all means necessary” would not seem to preclude the use of force, the law has been nicknamed the “Hague
Invasion Act.” See US: “Hague Invasion Act” Becomes Law, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 3, 2002), http://
www.hrw.org/en/news/2002/08/03/us-hague-invasion-act-becomes-law.
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responsibilities and powers are structured under the Rome Statute. Put simply,
the very architecture the Rome Statute hinges on a delicate compromise
between global and local sovereignty in matters of justice.124 Under the
principle of complementarity, sometimes described as the “cornerstone” of the
Rome Statute, member states exercise primary but only conditional
sovereignty in matters of justice, with power effectively ceded to the ICC
where a member is “unwilling or unable” to prosecute a case itself.125 The
“unwilling or unable” standard echoes other emerging international norms and
practices associated with the “responsibility to protect” and the US war on
terror that are serving to reconfigure the relationship between global and local
by replacing traditional notions of sovereignty with a sense of conditionality.126

124 See Rosalind Shaw & Lars Waldorf, Introduction, in LOCALIZING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE:
INTERVENTIONS AND PRIORITIES AFTER MASS VIOLENCE 19 (Rosalind Shaw & Lars Waldorf eds., 2010)
(describing the ICC as “an uneasy and unstable compromise between international justice and state
sovereignty”).
125 See Rome Statute, supra note 72, at art. 17; Thomas Obel Hansen, A Critical Review of the ICC’s
Recent Practice Concerning Admissibility Challenges and Complementarity, 13 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 217
(2012) (noting that “[T]he principle of complementarity . . . has often been pointed to as the cornerstone of the
Rome Statute”). The phrase “unwilling or unable” is defined in only the broadest terms in the Statute, but
under the Court’s emerging jurisprudence, it has largely come to pivot on a determination of inactivity. See id.
at 218.
126 Consider, for example, the various formulations of the emerging principle of the responsibility to
protect, or “R2P,” where a nation state’s sovereignty effectively becomes conditional on its ability or
willingness to protect its people from mass atrocities. See THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT xi (2001) (providing that while
“primary responsibility” for protection lies with each individual state, “the principle of non-intervention yields
to the international responsibility to protect” where the state is “unwilling or unable” to protect its people from
serious harm); U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,
para. 201 U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) (noting that there “is a growing acceptance that while sovereign
Governments have the primary responsibility to protect their own citizens . . . when they are unable or
unwilling to do so that responsibility should be taken up by the wider international community . . . .”). The
threshold for intervention was arguably raised in 2005 with the language adopted in the World Summit
Outcome Document where it was agreed that national authorities must “manifestly fail” to protect before
intervention is warranted. G.A. Res. 60/1, para. 139, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 15, 2005). Beyond R2P, a
similar construction of a conditional sovereignty can be seen in the Obama Administration’s controversial
claim to the right to unilaterally pursue and kill targets in states without consent if that country is deemed
“unable or unwilling to suppress” what the United States believes to be a threat. See Department of Justice
White Paper: Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational
Leader of Al-Qa’ida or an Associated Force, NBC NEWS (2013), http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/
sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf. Both R2P and the Obama administration’s terrorism policy
might be considered to be an expression of a larger post Cold War trend where the “transformation of the
adversary into a criminal [has] permitted, in the name of protecting humanity, intervention beyond state
boundaries.” Pierre Hazan, Transitional Justice after September 11, in LOCALIZING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE:
INTERVENTIONS AND PRIORITIES AFTER MASS VIOLENCE 52 (Rosalind Shaw & Lars Waldorf eds., 2010).
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While the principle of complementarity is in many ways a form of
deference to the local, and stands in contrast to the primacy of jurisdiction
exercised by the ad hoc tribunals, it also establishes a potential tension between
the global and the local insofar as it invites the Court to stand as ultimate
arbiter as to the adequacy of local effort and capacity.127 The principle of
complementarity would also seem to preclude local approaches to atrocity that
differ from a retributivist approach in some instances.128 Consider in this
regard the possible response of the ICC not just to a local pardon or grant of
amnesty, but an effort to address offenses using restorative, “traditional,” or
otherwise alternative local practices of justice and reconciliation.129 In
instances without concurrent prosecutions, would such alternative approaches
to justice be tantamount to “unwilling or unable” under the terms of the Rome
Statute? While former Chief Prosecutor Louis Moreno-Ocampo has suggested
that there should be great flexibility when it comes to lower-level offenders
and the modalities of justice applied, the possibility for deviating from
international retributivism when it comes to high-level offenders is less
clear.130
Building upon the principle of complementarity and the notion of the
primary responsibility of national governments, the ICC has no enforcement
mechanisms of its own, but is completely dependent on state cooperation to
carry out investigations and enforce its judgments.131 Particularly in cases of
self-referral under Article 14 of the Rome Statute, this can create special
challenges to the Court’s legitimacy as ICC intervention is played through the
prism of local politics.132 In Uganda, for example, a 2003 referral by the

127 See Rome Statute, supra note 72, at art. 87(7); see also Alexander Greenawalt, Complementarity in
Crisis: Uganda, Alternative Justice, and the International Criminal Court, 50 VA. J. INT’L 107, 110 (2009).
Aside from deference, it should be noted that the principle of complementarity also acknowledges the reality
that the ICC is a court of limited jurisdiction without the resources to address the great bulk of the world’s
human rights atrocities.
128 See Greenawalt, supra note 127, at 141–44.
129 Some scholars take exception to the word “traditional” as a description of such practices because it can
imply that they are static and because it can also have pejorative implications. As noted in Part IV, infra.,
“traditional” practices used in the modern-day transitional justice context tend to be adaptations of much older
forms of local justice and reconciliation practices.
130 See Greenawalt, supra note 127, at 141–44.
131 See Charles Jalloh, What Makes a Crime Against Humanity a Crime Against Humanity, 28 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 381, 419 (2013).
132 Under Article 14(1), “A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed requesting the Prosecutor to
investigate the situation for the purpose of determining whether one or more specific persons should be
charged with the commission of such crimes.” Rome Statute, supra note 72, at art. 14(1).
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Ugandan government resulted in the indictment of senior-level commanders in
the Lord’s Resistance Army.133 This referral proved divisive for several
reasons. First, the action arguably subverts local judicial and reconciliation
practices in Northern Uganda where segments of the population would prefer
the use of customary justice practices to the Western retributive justice of the
ICC.134 Second, because it would seem to turn a blind eye to violations
committed by the Ugandan army at the height of the civil war in Northern
Uganda, potentially giving the impression that the ICC is taking sides in a
conflict rather than meting out impartial justice.135 Similarly, in Côte d’Ivoire,
former President Laurent Gbagbo stands indicted as an indirect co-perpetrator
of crimes against humanity while crimes committed by forces loyal to his
erstwhile political opponent, current president Alassane Ouattara, are largely
overlooked.136 In this and other cases, it may prove difficult for the ICC to
serve as a credible check on state power while needing to tread lightly enough
to ensure local cooperation.137
Both the Ugandan and Ivorian cases illustrate one of the key challenges for
the ICC and international tribunals more generally vis-à-vis the local. To stand
wholly aloof and independent from the local invites mistrust and
misunderstanding, ultimately undercutting the potential to do more than
develop abstract international legal precedents. Yet the ICC is also dependent
on the local for its day-to-day work, and this carries with it the possibility of
playing into local political agendas that may further notions of victor’s justice,
besmirch the impartiality and credibility of the ICC, and play into narratives
133

See generally, TIM ALLEN, TRIAL JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE LORD’S
RESISTANCE ARMY (2006).
134 See Branch, supra note 45, at 195. It should be noted, however, that the Acholi population is not a
monolith, and there are also segments of the population that support ICC intervention. See Id. at 192.
135 See Branch, supra note 45, at 187–90. The suggestion of partiality was not helped when then Chief
Prosecutor Louis Moreno-Ocampo appeared at a joint press conference in London with President Museveni in
January 2004. See Michael Otim & Marieke Wierda, Justice at Juba: International Obligations and Local
Demands in Northern Uganda, in COURTING CONFLICT? JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA 22 (Nicholas
Waddell and Phil Clark eds., 2008). There are also suggestions that it was actually Moreno-Ocampo who first
persuaded Museveni to file the “self-referral” in the first place, further giving the impression of some kind of
unseemly partnership. See Phil Clark, Law, Politics and Pragmatism: The ICC and Case Selection in the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda, in COURTING CONFLICT? JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA
43 (Nicholas Waddell and Phil Clark eds., 2008).
136 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TURNING RHETORIC INTO REALITY: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SERIOUS
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN COTE D’IVOIRE 10 (2013), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/04/03/
turning-rhetoric-reality-0; see also Pascal Airault, Côte d’Ivoire – CPI: Gbagbo ou le Bénéfice du Doute,
JEUNE AFRIQUE, (June 14, 2013) http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/JA2735p010-012.xml0/.
137 See Janine Natalya Clark, Peace, Justice and the International Criminal Court: Limitations and
Possibilities, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 521, 527–29 (2011).
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that would see in the ICC a Western project that picks winners and plays
favorites.138 What seems clear is that an international tribunal that ignores the
complexity of local context (history, politics, culture, etc.) does so at its own
peril.139 Building the legitimacy of transitional and post-conflict justice
interventions over time will likely require an exquisite sensitivity to context,
and this may, as Greenawalt has argued, “call for as much, if not more, openended political assessment and balancing than for legal expertise.”140
While the dilemmas of the global and the local are perhaps most acute in
the realm of international and mixed tribunals, truth commissions often raise
similar issues, though perhaps in more subtle ways. Over the last thirty years,
the truth commission has become a truly global phenomenon, with some forty
commissions having been created, and new ones emerging on a fairly regular
basis.141 Though their mandates, composition, and powers vary greatly, most
truth commissions attempt to accomplish three essential tasks: (1) diagnosing
“what went wrong” in the lead up to the conflict or period of abuses; (2)
documenting and analyzing the human rights abuses that were perpetrated; and
(3) offering prescriptions for the future with a view to preventing recurrence of
conflict.142
These tasks would seem to require an approach that is much more openended, context sensitive, and participatory than most tribunals. And indeed,
138 See Glasius, supra note 116, at 519 (arguing that “[o]n the basis of current indictments [the ICC
prosecutor] could even be accused of exercising victor’s justice . . . He has helped governments, including
some that are none too friendly to human rights, to constrain rebels and rogue states under the banner of
international law.”).
139 For this reason, it has been argued that a “stakeholder assessment” employing qualitative interviews,
ethnographies, focus groups, or population-based surveys should be carried out prior to a transitional justice
intervention in order to discern local preferences, values, and cultural knowledge. See Ramji-Nogales, supra
note 10, at 63–67. Nogales argues that under this model, the ICC prosecutor “would issue an indictment only if
the population expresses a preference for international prosecutions in a distant location.” Id. at 70. While
efforts along these lines to gain a greater appreciation of context would be a welcome step forward in many
instances, at the same time, in the case of a potential ICC intervention based on a self-referral by a national
government, this would raise some serious questions about sovereignty in the context of international justice.
Even where a government might not be fully representative or a population divided, one could ask whether it is
appropriate for an international treaty-based institution to do an end run around a state party in this way.
140 See Greenawalt, supra note 127, at 159.
141 In her authoritative book on the topic, Priscilla Hayner documents the existence of forty modern-day
truth commissions. HAYNER, supra note 28, at 256–62. Since that volume’s publication, new commissions
have emerged in Côte d’Ivoire and Brazil. See INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, http://
www.ictj.org/our-work/regions-and-countries/cote-divoire (last visited Sept. 19, 2014); see also
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN BRAZIL, http://transitionaljusticeinbrazil.com/truth-commission-brazil/ (last visited
Sept. 6, 2014).
142 Sharp, supra note 62, at 84–90.
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truth commissions tend to be located in the affected region, largely staffed by
locals, and typically involve the direct participation of a greater number of
members of the affected public than a tribunal.143 At the same time, as Rama
Mani has noted, owing to restricted mandates and budgets, participation of the
local population can still be quite limited, and the dissemination of reports can
be erratic, incomplete, or even nonexistent.144 Nevertheless, truth commissions
have, by and large, been spared the trenchant critiques directed toward
tribunals vis-à-vis their rather clumsy engagement with the local.
Yet there is also a sense in which truth commissions have become part of a
global project rather than a local initiative, a box to tick on post-conflict
checklist funded by international donors and assisted by a shadow staff of
international consultants, rather than the result of a home-grown push for the
particular type of truth and accountability that a truth commission can
deliver.145 One might consider in this regard the truth commission in East
Timor, established not by domestic actors, but by a legal act of the UN’s
Human Rights Unit,146 or the extremely close association between the
International Center for Transitional Justice and the work of the Moroccan
Equity and Reconciliation Commission (Instance Équité et Réconciliation).147
The result may often be a truth-seeking process that is not as attuned to local
needs and realities as one might expect. Thus, Cavallaro and Albuja observe
that in some respects truth commissions tend to hew to a “dominant script” that
has been established over time not because it was necessarily perfectly attuned
to each new context, but as a result of “repeated information exchange and

143 There has been at least one call for a permanent international truth commission. See generally, Michael
Scharf, The Case for a Permanent International Truth Commission, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 375 (1997).
That said, as Hayner has noted, “[m]ost truth commissions are predominantly national, in both commission
members and staff.” HAYNER, supra note 28, at 214–15. A notable exception is El Salvador where the truth
commission was under the administration and oversight of the United Nations, with an entirely foreign staff
and set of commissioners. Id. at 214.
144 Rama Mani, Rebuilding an Inclusive Political Community After War, 36 SEC. DIALOGUE 511, 519
(2005).
145 See David Mendeloff, Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding: Curb the
Enthusiasm?, 6 INT’L STUD. REV. 355, 355–56 (2004) (noting that truth-telling is increasingly considered a
necessary component of the post-conflict peacebuilding process, together with demobilization, disarmament,
and the holding of postwar elections).
146 See Carsten Stahn, Justice Under Transitional Administration: Contours and Critique of a Paradigm,
27 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 311, 335–36 (2005).
147 See Mark Freeman & Veerle Opgenhaffen, INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST., Transitional Justice in
Morocco: A Progress Report 2–3 (November 2005), http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Morocco-ProgressReport-2005-English.pdf; see also Morocco, ICTY’s Role, INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST., http://ictj.org/ourwork/regions-and-countries/morocco (last visited July 22, 2013).
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consultations.”148 Funding from international donors, training workshops by
international NGOs, and the occasional “technical assistance” provided by
international consultants likely contribute to this phenomenon.
More fundamentally, anthropologist Rosalind Shaw has argued that the
truth commission as a global phenomenon is rooted in Western modes of truth
telling and traditions of public confession and may not be appropriate in
cultures with a different historical grounding.149 In Sierra Leone, for example,
many people preferred a “forgive and forget” approach grounded in local
practices of memory, healing, and social forgetting.150 Similarly, in
Mozambique, Mani argues, the desire to remember the truth did not even
exist.151 The prevailing sentiment seemed to be that “the less we dwell on the
past, the more likely reconciliation will be,” and traditional cleansing rituals
were used to help reintegrate combatants into their communities and at the
sites of massacres.152 Assumptions about the purportedly universal benefits of
verbally remembering violence that appear to undergird the work of most truth
commissions, Shaw argues, may undermine and serve to displace these
alternative approaches to dealing with the past.153 This may explain why many
Sierra Leoneans attending truth commission hearings appeared to be less than
enthusiastic about the process, though Kelsall notes that some hearings may
have had unintended benefits once locals started to transform them through the
incorporation of a process of community ritual.154
From this, it can be said that many of the assumptions of truth
commissions—including the notion that personal healing promotes national
healing, that truth-telling promotes reconciliation, and that forgetting the past
necessarily leads to war—even if valid in some contexts and cultures, may not
hold in others. For these and other reasons, Mendeloff argues that one should
not be so quick to proclaim the necessity of truth commission in the aftermath
of violent conflict.155 As with tribunals, the need for context-specific
148

Cavallaro & Albuja, supra note 62, at 125.
See generally Rosalind Shaw, Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions; Lessons from Sierra
Leone (United States Institute for Peace Special Report 130, 2005).
150 See id. at 9.
151 Mani, supra note 144, at 519.
152 HAYNER, supra note 28, at 197–203.
153 See Rosalind Shaw, Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions; Lessons from Sierra Leone,
SPECIAL REP. FOR THE U.S. INST. OF PEACE, Feb. 2005, at 1, available at http://www.usip.org/resources/
rethinking-truth-and-reconciliation-commissions-lessons-sierra-leone.
154 See generally Kelsall, supra note 46, at 361.
155 See generally Mendeloff, supra note 145, at 355.
149

SHARP GALLEYSPROOFS2

100

12/3/2014 8:57 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

approaches that take into account questions of local ownership, agency,
priorities, values, and practices must be given greater weight if truth-seeking
practices and institutions are to live up to their many promises.156
III. THE PROMISES AND PITFALLS OF THE LOCAL
Ultimately, no rule of law reform, justice reconstruction, or
transitional justice initiative imposed from the outside can hope to be
successful or sustainable . . . [w]e must learn better how to respect
and support local ownership, local leadership and a local
constituency for reform, while at the same time remaining faithful to
United Nations norms and standards.
—U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict
Societies, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616, ¶ 17 (Aug. 23,
2004).

If an imperious global justice has in some contexts been stymied by a hamfisted engagement with the local that has served to blunt both legitimacy and
effectiveness, making the global in some ways part of the problem, can it be
that giving greater weight to principles like “local ownership” will lead to
better solutions in the transitional justice context? Within U.N. policy literature
in particular, the concept of local ownership has become nearly sacrosanct,
with incantations to the local found across range of policy documents.157 Some
see in the prominence of the concept an attempt to paper over the legitimacy
crisis in U.N. peacekeeping and peacebuilding, sparked in part by criticism
emphasizing their neo-colonial and overly Western character.158 But whatever
the exact impetus, it is painfully clear that rhetorical tribute to local ownership
has often failed to translate into meaningful changes “on the ground,” making

156 See id. at 358–61 (2004) (outlining claims made with respect to the beneficial effects of truth
commissions on social healing and reconciliation, justice, the official historical record, public education,
institutional reform, democracy, and deterrence).
157 A 2011 U.N. report on the rule of law together with annexes invokes the word “ownership” no less
than 17 times. See U.N. Secretary-General, Strengthening and Coordinating United Nations Rule of Law
Activities, U.N. Doc. A/66/133 (August 8, 2011). While this may be an extreme example, Simon Chesterman,
who has written widely about the concept of ownership in post-conflict peacebuilding, has noted that “[e]very
U.N. mission and development programme now stresses the importance of local ‘ownership.’” Chesterman,
supra note 1, at 41. The concept itself is often traced to the field of economic development, and represents the
evolution in some ways of concepts like participatory development. See Chesterman, supra note 9, at 7; see
also Benjamin de Carvalho & Niels Nagelhus Schia, Local and National Ownership in Post-Conflict Liberia:
Foreign and Domestic Inside Out? 3, 6 (Security in Practice, NUPI Working Paper No. 787, 2011).
158 See id. at 1–6.
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the concept superficial and slippery in practice.159 At the same time, because of
the intellectual currency that the concept has achieved in donor and policy
circles, it continues to be invoked by different actors in different ways to assert
influence over post-conflict policy processes.160 Bendix and Stanley, for
example, observe that in the context of security sector reform donors demand
local ownership to legitimize donor-driven policy prescriptions, local
governments demand local ownership to secure their own power and influence,
and non-state actors want local ownership as a means to give themselves
access to the policy process.161
Taken together, local ownership has become something of an empty
signifier, employed by nearly everyone, while at the same time remaining
vague and poorly understood.162 Yet the opacity of the concept does not
diminish its importance. As Donais has argued, “there are real limits on the
ability of outsiders to shape, direct, and influence events within states
emerging from conflict,” meaning that there is no real alternative to
substantive local ownership over the longer term.163 International experts can
run an international or hybrid tribunal in the short term and donors can fund a
truth commission, but ultimately only “deep and locally owned social and
political dynamics” can guarantee “well functioning institutions that produce
substantive results.”164 Compounding matters, successful initiatives require the
kind of profound local knowledge of context and culture that international
actors almost never possess.165 Yet even with ample awareness of context,
159 See Donais, supra note 9, at 5; see also Chesterman, supra note 9, at 9. Indeed, far short of giving
meaningful content to “ownership,” Longman has argued that “[g]overnments and international institutions,
such as the United Nations, rarely, if ever, consult affected populations when formulating policies aimed at
rebuilding post-war societies.” Longman, supra note 83, at 206. But see Anna Triponel & Stephen Pearson,
What do You Think Should Happen? Public Participation in Transitional Justice, 22 PACE INT’L L. REV. 103
(2010) (examining a trend toward increasing public consultation in the set up phase of transitional justice
mechanisms).
160 See Patricia Lundy, Exploring Home-Grown Transitional Justice and Its Dilemmas: A Case Study of
the Historical Enquiries Team, Northern Ireland, 3 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 321, 329 (2009) (arguing that
“the concept of local/home-grown transitional justice is capable of being expropriated and manipulated to
mask or serve other interests and ‘unjust’ practices”).
161 Bendix & Stanley, supra note 8, at 101.
162 Chesterman, supra note 9, at 7–10.
163 See Donais, supra note 5, at 755, 772.
164 See Uvin, supra note 14, at 186.
165 Leopold von Carlowitz, GENEVA CTR. FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES (DCAF),
LOCAL OWNERSHIP IN PRACTICE: JUSTICE SYSTEMS REFORM IN KOSOVO AND LIBERIA 54 (2011), available at
http://www.dcaf.ch/content/download/35955/527124/files/op23.pdf (observing that while they often possess
technical knowledge and professional skills, international actors mostly lack sufficient knowledge of local
structures and traditions).
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interventions felt to be imposed “from the outside” are more likely to be seen
as illegitimate, raising the possibility of backlash and ill will towards
reforms.166 In this sense, the struggle to give greater significance to local
ownership can be seen as profoundly pragmatic.
More fundamentally, however, the concept of local ownership raises
important normative questions, asking us to consider whether people have the
right to determine their own destiny and make their own mistakes.167 As Stahn
observes, to even ask the question suggests a certain paternalism,168 and could
risk pathologizing and infantilizing entire post-war populations.169 The
normative pull of principles of self-determination and democratic control
emanating from the concept of local ownership is especially strong when you
consider that even with the best of intentions, errors of intervention are likely,
yet it is the locals who must live with and bear the costs of these errors over the
long term.170 International actors, in contrast, will pack their bags and move on
to the next crisis. In this sense, the concept of local ownership asks us to
recognize that if the goals of post-conflict peacebuilding include classic liberal
goods of democracy, good governance, and the rule of law, divorcing control
and agency over a set of post-conflict initiatives from accountability and cost
bearing is ultimately a self-defeating exercise in contradiction.171
Despite its obvious importance, the turn to the locals in matters of postconflict justice and peacebuilding is no panacea. In calling for better
engagement with questions of locality, there is danger of propagating the myth
of a virtuous local that may lead to a tendency to overlook its complexities.172
Even without such romanticization, making local ownership meaningful in the
post-conflict context is extraordinarily challenging. The more intrusive
166

Talentino, supra note 6, at 153.
See Stahn, supra note 146, at 326; von Carlowitz, supra note 165, at 54 (observing that “local
ownership might remain rhetoric because international actors are unwilling to allow their local counterparts to
make their own mistakes.”); An-Na’im, supra note 39, at 199 (arguing that “the practice of justice for every
society can only emerge through an indigenous process of trial and error.”).
168 Stahn, supra note 146, at 326.
169 See Vanessa Pupavac, Pathologizing Populations and Colonizing Minds: International
Psychosocial
Programs in Kosovo, 27 ALTERNATIVES: GLOBAL, LOC., POL. 489, 490 (2002).
170 See Uvin, supra note 14, at 185 (2001); see also Stahn, supra note 146, at 329.
171 See Gerald Knaus & Felix Martin, Travails of the European Raj, 14 J. OF DEMOCRACY 58, 64 (2003)
(exploring tensions between unaccountable international intervention and the need to plant the seeds of
democratic politics in Bosnia); see also Stahn, supra note 146, at 330 (exploring how the United Nations
Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo absolved itself of legal checks on its power, making accountability
a one-way street where locals are expected to bear the costs).
172 See Richmond, supra note 69, at 158–59; Mazlish, supra note 25, at 95.
167
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international peace and justice interventions tend to often occur in regions
where there has been a profound breakdown in local political and normative
structures and ordering.173 In some cases, the formal institutions of governance
have been hollowed out or have collapsed entirely, and much of the expertise
that may have helped to re-build the country has fled, resulting in serious
deficits in terms of capacity and technical expertise.174 Complicating matters
further, with the ethnic, political, and economic cleavages that often result and
continue in the aftermath of conflict, there is often no coherent set of “local
owners” in the first place.175 Indeed, it has been argued that “[p]ostconflict
spaces, almost by definition, are characterized far more by diversity and
division than by unity.”176 In this context, post-conflict justice, like other
interventions affecting distributions of power, can be utilized by post-war elites
as a means of jockeying for gain, furthering partisan political agendas, and
attempting to re-impose pre-conflict power structures that may be
discriminatory or otherwise not consistent with international human rights
standards.177 Ultimately, therefore, as one set of waggish commentators put it,
“the local ownership championed by the international community is not local
ownership tout court but local ownership of a specific kind: the good kind.”178
If the post-conflict waters are sewn with mines that serve to make local
ownership difficult in practice, navigation is made all the more complex by the
role, expectations, and financial power of the international actors drawn to the
scene. Taking concepts like local ownership seriously necessitates significant
additional time and expense, yet international actors and donors tend to be

173 Examples are not in short supply, but post-war Sierra Leone and Liberia would be among the more
challenging of such contexts.
174 As an example, the brutal Liberian civil war spanned more than a decade, resulting in the loss of as
many as 250,000 lives and the displacement of 1 million individuals. These are staggering numbers for a
country whose pre-war population numbered just over 2 million. See Sharp, supra note 62. In Rwanda, 10% of
the population of 8 million had been killed and over 2 million had fled to neighboring countries. See Barbara
Oomen, Donor-Driven Justice and its Discontents: The Case of Rwanda, 36 DEV. & CHANGE 887, 900 (2005).
175 See Donais, supra note 5, at 759; see also Edward Joseph, Ownership is Over-rated, 27 SAIS REV.
109, 119 (2007) (contending that in some instances locals “do not take ownership of their problems primarily
because they do not agree on who ought to be the owner.”).
176 See Donais, supra note 5, at 759.
177 Of course, the dangers of insertion of self-interest by international elites into the peacebuilding process
can be equally problematic. See Kristoffer Lidén, Roger Mac Ginty & Oliver P. Richmond, Introduction:
Beyond Northern Epistemologies of Peace: Peacebuilding Reconstructed?, 16 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 587, 594
(2009); see also Knaus & Martin, supra note 171, at 66 (noting that like all institutions, international
peacebuilding missions have a tendency to pursue self-interest).
178 de Carvalho & Schia, supra note 157, at 3.
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impatient and anxious for results.179 At the same time, international standards
for transitional justice interventions are institutionally demanding, tending to
privilege technocratic expertise over deep local contextual knowledge.180
When coupled with global-local imbalances in terms of financial capacity, the
end result is that all too often post-conflict justice interventions tend to place
less of a premium on local ownership in practice than the global policy rhetoric
would suggest.
Taken together, in many instances it may be said that true local ownership
in the sense of full local agency and control is simply unrealistic.181 In the
context of international and hybrid tribunals in particular, it may well be
impossible.182 How, for example, could one truly have local ownership—again
in the sense of agency and control—of a prosecution by the ICC, ICTY, or
SCSL?183 Even outside the context of such tribunals, global power and funding
structures, together with the momentum and politics of the international justice
advocacy movement, would seem to suggest that some degree of international
involvement is inevitable as a practical matter.
Building on this, it has been argued that in some cases full local ownership
may not even be desirable, and that some degree of international involvement
is necessary in at least a supporting role, if not more.184 In many instances for
example, “local violent conflicts are no longer local or traditional in their
causation or dynamics,” having been transformed by “interventions of regional
and global actors.”185 In such cases, simple concepts of “local solutions to local
179

See Lucius Botes & Dingie van Rensburg, Community Participation in Development: Nine Plagues
and Twelve Commandments, 35 COMMUNITY DEV. J. 41, 50–51 (2000) (discussing the tensions in the context
of development projects between pressures for results and the process demands of community participation);
Stahn, supra note 146, at 336–37 (noting that greater local ownership with respect to judicial reconstruction in
Afghanistan led to a slower process that was less protective of individual rights).
180 See Bosire, supra note 55, at 72.
181 See SIMON CHESTERMAN, YOU, THE PEOPLE: THE UNITED NATIONS, TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION,
AND STATE-BUILDING 242 (2003).
182 See Matthew Saul, Local Ownership of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Restorative
and Retributive Effects, 12 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 427, 434 (2012) (arguing that one cannot always assume that
“more local ownership will always be desirable.” Rather, “it is possible that in some contexts where it is selfevident that there is a need for an international criminal tribunal, it might be in the best interests of the
situation overall for there to not be any particular effort to incorporate local ownership into the establishment
process.”).
183 In the case of the ICC, one might say that the opportunity for full local ownership effectively
disappears the moment a state is deemed “unwilling or unable” to prosecute under the terms of Article 17 of
the Rome Statute.
184 See Joseph, supra note 175, at 115–16.
185 An-Na’im, supra note 39, at 202.
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problems” would seem to fail to capture the complexity of the situation. There
are also arguments that some kind of global-local balance is required due to
“capacity gaps” and the possibility of excessive parochialism.186 Might it be,
for example, that a better global-local balance in the trial of Saddam Hussein
could have resulted in something less like a show-trial?187 Similar weaknesses
in the national judiciaries of Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia
led, in part, to the creation of international hybrid tribunals.188 Finally, outside
of the courtroom, other local experiments in transitional justice such as Gacaca
in Rwanda, described in greater detail below, can and do conflict with
international human rights standards—raising difficult questions about whether
and how to balance individual freedoms against principles of selfdetermination.189
For these and other reasons, while the local is often seen as one of the keys
to the legitimacy of transitional justice initiatives, perceived legitimacy is in
practice quite complex and there are no guarantees that a process will be seen
as legitimate at any level simply because there is a high degree of local
ownership.190 In some instances, local constituencies might actually express a
preference for an international prosecution, for example, due to perceptions
that national courts are corrupt and lack independence.191 In the end, therefore,
too much local may raise as many questions as too much global. As Mazlish
argues, the local cannot simply be used as a talisman to ward off all possible
intervention.192 The world over, someone’s local has often given way to a
larger local—with the dismantling of segregation in the Southern United Sates
being one example—the results of which are hard to disagree with in the long
term.193

186

See Joseph, supra note 175, at 115–16.
Id.
188 See McAuliffe, supra note 97, at 8–9, 24–28; see also Stahn, supra note 146, at 318–20 (reviewing
some of the challenges of national courts that may bolster an argument for some international involvement).
189 This dilemma is particularly acute in the case of Gacaca given the strong argument that it would have
been impossible for Rwanda to comply with all international standards relating to accountability norms,
victims’ rights, and due process.
190 See Matthew Saul, supra note 182, at 434 (noting that an increase in local ownership could come with
complications that can actually reduce legitimacy). Consider in this regard the example of Gacaca in Rwanda,
which though locally owned in the sense of literal control by the Rwandan government, has minimal
legitimacy in the eyes of many local constituencies. See Burnet, supra note 94, at 183, 188.
191 Observation based on the author’s experience documenting human rights violations in Guinea and
Côte d’Ivoire for Human Rights Watch.
192 Mazlish, supra note 25, at 98–99.
193 Id.
187
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Simply put, while there is no alternative to local ownership in the long run,
in the short-run at least, local ownership may at times be an impossible ideal. If
this makes for a very difficult needle to thread in terms of post-conflict
programming, it may explain why so much of the literature on local ownership
does little more than say that it is both important and hard.194 At the policy
level, the tendency in the face of these dilemmas is to elide complexity, with
local ownership becoming a sort of cheap bureaucratic trope to signal the need
for local “buy in” and support rather than meaningful input or control.195
Moving past this state of affairs in order to strike a better balance between
global and local requires that we look more deeply into constructions of
“global” and “local.”
IV. STRIKING A BETTER BALANCE BETWEEN GLOBAL AND LOCAL
For all of their importance, there is a sense in which the dilemmas of the
global and the local are false dilemmas created by rigid intellectual
categories.196 As Goodale has observed, outside of the academic and policy
literature, there is no place called “local” or “global”—any more than there is
an “international plane,” an “international community,” or places called “on
the ground” and “in the field,” yet these concepts are often spoken of as if they
actually existed.197 The global-local binary is also problematic insofar as it
implies that there are only two levels at which social processes emerge or
unfold, and insofar as it implicitly invokes a normative hierarchy and
teleology.198 Thus, both categories tend to essentialize and depoliticize sets of
actors that are neither ideologically monolithic nor politically homogenous.
For these and other reasons, some scholars have questioned the value of the
concept of the local, arguing instead for more complicated notions of
“glocality” and “translocality.”199

194

de Carvalho & Schia, supra note 157, at 3.
See CHESTERMAN, supra note 181, at 242 (arguing that in practice “ownership . . . is usually not
intended to mean control and often does not even imply a direct input into political questions.”).
196 See Lundy, supra note 160, at 329 (cautioning against using the local in simply binary terms).
197 See Mark Goodale, Locating Rights, Envisioning Law Between the Global and the Local, in THE
PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 5, 15–16 (Mark Goodale & Sally Engle Merry eds., 2007).
198 Id. at 14–15.
199 See Patricia Lundy, Paradoxes and Challenges of Transitional Justice at the “Local” Level: Historical
Enquiries in Northern Ireland, 6 CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL SCIENCE 89, 93 (reviewing perspectives that seek to
move beyond the “stark and mutually exclusive binary oppositions of ‘local’ and global that tend to dominate
transitional justice literature.”); Mazlish, supra note 25, at 99.
195
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Despite these problems, the global-local distinction remains a central theme
in human rights discourse, and is useful for its ability to underscore power
asymmetries in the transitional justice context.200 Similarly, as a policy trope
and as an ideal, the concept of the local can provide an important
counterweight to the centralizing and universalizing tendencies of transitional
justice and liberal international peacebuilding more generally.201 There may
therefore be times when it is useful to categorize and essentialize to avoid
pushing power differentials to the background, somewhat in keeping with
Spivak’s concept of “strategic essentialisms.”202 Thus, concepts of the local
and the global retain utility for purposes of both analysis and policymaking,
even if they do not accurately describe the full complexity of all transitional
justice processes as they emerge and unfold. Working through the dilemmas of
the local therefore requires a complicated analytical tightrope act. On the one
hand, the global-local binary remains a useful construct for the reasons
articulated. At the same time, understanding the complexity of global-local
dynamics requires some deconstruction and destabilization, breaking down
simple binary notions.
The analytical utility of breaking down simple binary notions of local and
global can be illustrated by examining the Gacaca process in Rwanda.203
Historically, Gacaca served as a form of community-based informal arbitration
employed to resolve minor disputes at the village level.204 Following the
200 See Mark Goodale, Locating Rights, Envisioning Law Between the Global and the Local, in THE
PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 5, 23 (Mark Goodale & Sally Engle Merry eds., 2007).
201 See Susan Thomson & Rosemary Nagy, Law, Power and Justice: What Legalism Fails to Address in
the Functioning of Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts, 5 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 11, 23 (2010) (positioning the
turn to the local in transitional justice as a “corrective to the shortcomings of internationalized, ‘one-size-fitsall’ approaches.” Id. at 11).
202 See Peterson, supra note 70, at 14.
203 If focusing on the case of Gacaca, I do not mean to conflate the local with customary law and tradition
or to suggest that the dilemmas of the local can be solved by mere incorporation of local ritual. Ultimately,
giving greater weight to the local in matters of post-conflict justice must address the deeper and fundamental
privileging of Western liberal responses to atrocity that may crowd out other ways of understanding and doing
justice. Nevertheless, examination of the tensions associated with the embrace of local ritual and tradition as
seen in the Gacaca process is useful to help complicate simplistic binary notions of global and local, and as an
antidote to the romanticization of the local that initially accompanied Gacaca. See Oomen, supra note 174, at
903 (noting that there was “an element of Orientalism” in the appeal that Gacaca held for the international
community).
204 There is an ample literature on Gacaca, including its historical origins and evolution. See generally
PHIL CLARK, THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA: JUSTICE
WITHOUT LAWYERS (2010); Burnet, supra note 94, at 177; Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity:
Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2006); Timothy Longman, Justice at the
Grassroots? Gacaca Trials in Rwanda, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: BEYOND
TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE 206, 206–28 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Javier Mariezcurrena eds., 2006).
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arrests of suspected génocidaires in the years that followed the 1994 genocide,
Rwanda’s prison population swelled to well over 130,000.205 These figures
grossly overwhelmed the capacity of Rwanda’s legal system, creating the very
realistic possibility that thousands of individuals would either die in Rwanda’s
severely overcrowded prisons before they would be granted a trial, or need to
be released without trial.206 This led to pressure from a variety of actors to
solve a very palpable human rights problem, and the idea adapting Gacaca to
address genocide-related crimes emerged.207
While its exact provenance is somewhat murky, the idea of using Gacaca
may have arisen out of a conversation between a researcher for Human Rights
Mission and some professors from the National University of Butare.208
Alternatively, Oomen points to “evidence that it was representatives of the
donor community who first raised the idea.”209 Others point to a 1996 report by
the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights, which concluded that
Gacaca might play a role in dealing with genocide-related crimes, but only as
a sort of truth-seeking adjunct to the work of tribunals or a community
reconciliation mechanism that should be buffered from too much government
interference.210 Whatever the precise origins, the idea of drafting Gacaca into
national service to address Rwanda’s post-genocide justice challenges was
eagerly seized upon by the Rwandan government and members of the
international donor community.211
As adopted and adapted, the Gacaca of “tradition” was effectively
transformed by the Rwandan government from a relatively informal
community-driven conflict-resolution mechanism to a modernized and
formalized public punitive justice institution backed by the power of the
state.212 Whereas pre-genocide Gacaca was not applied in cases of cattle theft,
205

See Burnet, supra note 94, at 177.
See Des Forges & Longman, supra note 81, at 58.
207 See Burnet, supra note 206, at 175.
208 Id. at 176.
209 See Oomen, supra note 174, at 902.
210 See Bert Ingelare, The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, in TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION
AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT: LEARNING FROM AFRICAN EXPERIENCES 25, 31–36. (Luc Huyse & Mark Salter
eds., 2008).
211 See Oomen, supra note 174, at 897 (noting the “massive support” on the part of donors for Gacaca).
212 In describing the ways in which Gacaca was adapted, I do not mean to suggest that its pre-genocide or
“traditional” form was static. As noted by Luc Huyse, “traditional techniques, in Rwanda and in other African
post-conflict countries, have been greatly altered in form and substances by the impact of colonization,
modernization, and civil war.” Luc Huyse, Introduction: Tradition-based Approaches in Peacemaking,
Transitional Justice, and Reconciliation Policies, in TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION AFTER
206
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murder, or other serious crimes, it was adapted to complex circumstances
involving mass atrocities and genocide.213 This proved especially troubling to
international human rights groups who questioned the lack of protections for
the accused, minimal training for Gacaca judges, and issues of corruption,
among other things.214
Despite some of the controversy, Gacaca was initially welcomed by many
outside Rwanda as a creative and pragmatic means to address a troubling
backlog of cases relating to the 1994 genocide.215 It also appeared to enjoy
widespread support by ordinary Rwandans.216 From a distance, it seemed to be
the embodiment of a homegrown, locally owned, culturally embedded
process—a Rwandan solution to Rwandan problems—yet this obfuscates some
of the complex reality.217 As noted, while loosely based on a traditional dispute
resolution process and championed by the Rwandan government as the only
possible solution, the impetus for Gacaca also owes much to discussion
generated by Rwandan scholars, international human rights activists, and U.N.
reports, to say nothing of sustained pressure from international NGOs and
other entities to address Rwanda’s serious prison overcrowding problem. It
was carried out in large part as a result of support from international donors.218
What was presented as “traditional” and “community based” was really a
hybrid that moved “back and forth between” historical origins and capture by
the nation state.219 Thus, to adopt the neologism of some scholars, it might

VIOLENT CONFLICT: LEARNING FROM AFRICAN EXPERIENCES 1, 6–7 (Luc Huyse & Mark Salter eds., 2008). In
this sense, the label “traditional” is potentially problematic insofar as it suggests a practice not subject to
constant change. See id. at 7. Bert Ingelare argues that the “new” Gacaca is such a radical departure from the
“old” that it represents an “invented tradition.” Ingelare, supra note 211, at 32. Others have suggested terms
such as “reinvented tradition” and “neo-traditional.”
213 See Waldorf, supra note 205, at 48 (noting that “traditional gacaca generally did not treat cattle theft,
murder, or other serious crimes, which were handled by chiefs or the king’s representatives”).
214 See Justice Compromised: The Legacy of Rwanda’s Community Based Gacaca Courts 4, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (May 2011), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/05/31/justice-compromised-0.
215 For a more upbeat, though cautious assessment at the outset of the implementation of Gacaca, see
generally Timothy Longman, supra note 205; see also Oomen, supra note 174, at 902 (noting that Gacaca was
once heralded as “ground-breaking” and “revolutionary.”).
216 Paul Gready, Reconceptualizing Transitional Justice: Embedded and Distanced Justice, 5 CONFLICT,
SECURITY & DEV’T 3, 13 (2005).
217 See Christine Venter, Eliminating Fear through Recreating Community in Rwanda: the Role of the
Gacaca Courts, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 577, 580 (2007) (describing Gacaca as a “uniquely Rwandan . . .
grassroots [effort] to deal with the genocide . . . from the bottom up.”). Of course, the Rwandan government
itself was also at some pains to present Gacaca as homegrown and locally devised. See Oomen, supra note
174, at 902.
218 See generally Oomen, supra note 174, at 887.
219 Huyse, supra note 213, at 8.
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indeed be correct to say that the origins and unfolding of the Gacaca process
were very much “glocal” or “translocal.”220 In this way, the emergence and
shaping of transitional justice processes might be seen as part of a continued
dialectical process between multiple “levels”—global, regional, national, and
community. Simple categories of global and local fail to capture this
complexity.
The complex reality of transitional justice processes only serves to further
illustrate just how problematic simple notions of local ownership really are.
Just as the global-local binary must be questioned and blurred, making better
sense of global-local dilemmas and interactions also requires us to break down
and unpack concepts like “local ownership” into constituent parts. In practice, I
argue, the term has become a sort-of catch all for concerns relating to actual
control (agency, decision making, funding), process (whether a transitional
justice initiative is “bottom-up,” participatory or homegrown, being shaped by
input from “the grassroots,” or “top-down” and imposed; whether it is driven
by the state or “the community”), and substance (whether a transitional justice
initiative honors and resonates with local values and practices). While the
control, process, and substance dimensions of local ownership are in practice
often going to be highly related, it may not be necessary to satisfy concerns
relating to all three for a transitional justice program to be perceived as
legitimate. For example, hypothetically, a U.N. or otherwise “externally”
controlled and funded program might be seen as legitimate by many local
constituencies if it were heavily shaped by a bottom-up participatory process
that put local priorities and practices at the heart of the program. In contrast, a
transitional justice program might be fully controlled by a national government
or other locals, and yet still be part of a state-centric solution imposed from the
top-down upon local peasant communities without significant input, and
ultimately be seen by many locals as lacking legitimacy.
Both hypotheticals presented here would seem to suggest that the process
dimension of local ownership is especially key to the design of transitional
justice interventions, not simply because process can help to generate feelings
of (il)legitimacy, but also because, in practice, satisfying process concerns may
tend to lead to transitional justice modalities that hit positive notes on the
substance axis.221 At the same time, undue focus on the process dimension
220 See Patricia Lundy, Paradoxes and Challenges of Transitional Justice at the “Local” Level: Historical
Enquiries in Northern Ireland, 6 CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL SCIENCE 89, 93 (2011).
221 See generally, Triponel & Pearson, supra note 159, at 103 (examining trend toward increasing public
consultation in the set up phase of transitional justice mechanisms).
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alone is potentially problematic as it has been observed in other contexts that
ideas like “participatory development” can easily be co-opted by states and
international institutions to their own ends.222 In the transitional justice context,
it has similarly been noted that where efforts at “consultation” do take place,
local communities are often asked for input into project implementation long
after more fundamental questions of design and set-up have already been
established, suggesting that process concerns are often treated as a shallow,
technical exercise.223 There is therefore a danger that as notions of process,
including participation, are mainstreamed, they become yet another
bureaucratic planning tool, muddying useful distinctions between genuinely
people-centered, bottom-up processes and top-down, technocratic ones.224
Finally, beyond process, one should not dismiss the importance of the control
dimension, which—being intimately linked to the power and politics of
transitional justice interventions—still plays an important role in global-local
frictions and feelings of legitimacy.
By offering this schema, the intent is not to suggest that categories of
control, process, and substances are in any way definitive, or that local
ownership could not be broken down into alternative or additional categories.
The key point is that thinking of local ownership multi-dimensionally based on
the unique history of each particular context is a much more useful exercise
than the loose sloganeering that often takes place around the concept today.
Again, the Gacaca process serves as a useful real-world illustration of some of
these complex dynamics.
At the most superficial level, the Gacaca process was very much “locally
owned” as compared to the ICTR, for example, in the sense that formal control
was retained by Rwandans. Yet to end there would be to confuse local
ownership with ownership by the national government, a distinction that is
potentially problematic in a context where the government cannot be assumed
to represent many local constituencies or to be subject to checks and balances
if it fails to consider their input.225 The results of the Gacaca process illustrate
222 See Lundy, supra note 160, at 329. The concept of participation has a long history in the field of
development, and is both revered and reviled in the literature for its power to both empower and co-opt. For a
review of the history and trajectory of the concept, see generally Sam Hickey & Giles Mohan, Towards
Participation as Transformation: Critical Themes and Challenges, in PARTICIPATION: FROM TYRANNY TO
TRANSFORMATION? (Samuel Hickey & Giles Mohan eds., 2004).
223 See Rubli, supra note 54, at 11–12.
224 See Hickey & Mohan, supra note 223, at 4.
225 See Oomen, supra note 174, at 899–902 (discussing the “increasingly oppressive” and authoritarianism
climate in Rwanda).
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that this kind of national ownership alone will often not be sufficient to create
legitimacy in the eyes of many local constituencies.226 Thus, the process
dimension of local ownership, including whether a transitional justice initiative
is carried out in a manner that is “bottom-up,” drawing upon meaningful input
and participation by affected communities, remains critical.227 While the
Gacaca process certainly involved a lot of participation by ordinary Rwandans
in the hearings themselves, attendance at Gacaca hearings eventually dwindled
and had to be coerced, and Rwandans had little space to contest dimensions of
the larger Gacaca process itself.228 Thus, there was a very real sense in which
the process was imposed from the top-down (with the top being Kigali rather
than New York or Geneva).229
Beyond control and process, there is also a substantive dimension to
questions of local ownership, including the extent to which a transitional
justice initiative honors and resonates with local values and practices. Even on
this score, the Gacaca process receives mixed results. While initially greeted
with enthusiasm by the Rwandan population as a distinctively Rwandan
approach to post-conflict justice in contrast with the remote and Western
ICTR, many Rwandans were ultimately alienated by the process and felt that it
lacked legitimacy.230 In many respects, the process appeared to be more in tune
with national (or government) values and priorities than community-based
ones in the sense that it was engineered to reinforce longstanding partisan
narratives favored by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) political party by
excluding crimes committed by the RPF from the Gacaca process.231 Thus,
Gacaca illustrates that adapting the trappings of local practices, traditions, and
rituals alone is not sufficient to generate a sense of legitimacy and good will
toward a transitional justice program.

226 Many ordinary Rwandans prefer the Gacaca courts over Rwanda’s national courts and the ICTR. See
Ingelare, supra note 211, at 51. At the same time, it is seen by other Rwandans as an imposition from Kigali.
See Burnet, supra note 94, 188 (2008); see also See Oomen, supra note 174, at 904 (noting that “the public at
large seemed to increasingly consider the [Gacaca] meetings as mandatory events to sit through, just like
community service.”).
227 See generally, Triponel & Pearson, supra note 159, at 103.
228 See Ingelare, supra note 211, at 46–47, 55.
229 See Burnet, supra note 94, 188.
230 See id.
231 See Christopher Le Mon, Rwanda’s Troubled Gacaca Courts, 14 HUM. RTS BRIEF 16 (Winter 2007),
available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/14/2lemon.pdf. The RPF was the military victor in the
Rwandan conflict and has effectively set the agenda for post-genocide Rwanda without much restraint. See
Ingelare, supra note 211, at 31–32.
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With the process concluded as of 2012, Gacaca leaves an ambiguous
legacy.232 While it constitutes an important experiment in post-conflict justice
programming, its glaring gaps and deficiencies also serve as something of a
cautionary tale.233 Initially projected as an exemplar of local ownership in
transitional justice, Gacaca was in practice another top-down, state-based
solution imposed on affected communities, and ultimately suffered a loss of
legitimacy as a result.234 Given the authoritarian political climate in Rwanda,
this should not be surprising.235 Rather than transcending Rwanda’s postgenocide political culture, Gacaca was simply played out through its prism.236
At a deeper level, Gacaca illustrates the almost inescapable pull of both
universalism and particularism in transitional justice processes, with notions of
what it means to do justice in the aftermath of conflict invariably shaped by
contested global and local standards.237 More than that, however, it represents
a clash of purportedly universal commitments, between liberal internationalism
and international human rights, on the one hand, and conceptions of local
autonomy, self-determination, and sovereignty on the other. Given the seeming
inevitability of these competing forces in many transitional justice
interventions, the disappointments and politics of Gacaca point not to the need
to abandon alternative or “hybrid” approaches to post-conflict justice, but to
consider possibilities that offer a better balance, including global-local balance,
along the multiple axes of local ownership: control, process, and substance.238
232 Phil Clark has written a comprehensive review of Gacaca, delving into strengths and weaknesses in
great detail. See PHIL CLARK, THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION IN
RWANDA; JUSTICE WITHOUT LAWYERS (2010); see also Ingelare, supra note 211, at 51–57 (evaluating the
strengths and weaknesses of Gacaca).
233 These include the fact that the Gacaca process actually led to increases in the numbers of the accused
and detained. See Burnet, supra note 94, at 178. It may have also increased conflict in some communities. See
id. at 174.
234 See Oomen, supra note 174, at 906–07; see also Thomson & Nagy, supra note 202, at 13 (describing
Gacaca as a “state-imposed” project).
235 See Thomson & Nagy, supra note 202, at 13 (noting that legal systems, traditional or otherwise,
“inescapably embody prevailing constellations of power.”).
236 See Andrew Iliff, Root and Branch: Discourses of ‘Tradition’ in Grassroots Transitional Justice, 6
INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 253, 256 (arguing that Gacaca was used to “bolster[] the current Rwandan
government’s framing of the genocide as a singular event legitimating its authoritarian rule.” Id. at 260).
237 For a review of the ways in which the universality debate in human rights can inform dilemmas of the
global and the local that arise in the transitional justice context, see generally Viaene & Brems, supra note 23,
at 199; see also Alexander Betts, Should Approaches to Post-conflict Justice and Reconciliation be
Determined Globally, Nationally, or Locally?, 17 EUR. J. DEV. RES. 736, 740–44 (2005) (discussing the ways
in which the universalism-versus-relativism debate played out in post-genocide Rwanda).
238 It is important to note that not all attempts to integrate local or “traditional” approaches to post-conflict
justice and reconciliation have been as controversial as Gacaca. These efforts have not typically substituted for
trials and truth commissions, but have served as an important complement to them. For example, in East
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As noted in the area of hybrid courts, practices of genuine global-local
hybridity hold promise, yet have not been adequately tested in practice,
suggesting the need for further innovation.239 For all of their promise, however,
future experiments in alternative or hybridized justice and reconciliation are
unlikely to involve easy compromise or simple solutions to the dilemmas of
the global and the local. Better global-local balance requires a give and take on
both “sides,”240 something that goes well beyond the lip service paid to
tokenistic concepts of local ownership today.241 Moving beyond superficial
concepts of local ownership will necessarily entail a fundamental reconsideration of the primacy of Western approaches to mass atrocity.242 Thus,
reimagining the foreclosed possibilities will require more than a simple call to

Timor’s Community Reconciliation Process, reconciliation between perpetrators and former combatants with
members of their estranged communities was facilitated by drawing upon elements of local ritual, arbitration,
and mediation practice. See generally Patrick Burgess, A New Approach to Restorative Justice – East Timor’s
Community Reconciliation Process, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: BEYOND
TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE 176–205 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Javier Mariezcurrena eds., 2006). In Sierra Leone,
the formal, state-sanctioned truth commission incorporated aspects of local ritual into its work. See generally
Tim Kelsall, supra note 46, at 361. The non-governmental organization Fambul Tok (“Family Talk” in the
Krio language) has also worked to facilitate a context-specific response to reconciliation. See generally
Augustine S.J. Park, Community-Based Restorative Transitional Justice in Sierra Leone, 13 CONTEMP. JUST.
REV. 95 (2010). All of these efforts have been marked by significant elements of global-local hybridity.
239 The concept of hybridity has been offered in the broader context of peacebuilding as one way to begin
to move beyond simple global-local debates and to better capture the complexity of the relationships between
the many actors involved. See generally Roger Mac Ginty, INTERNATIONAL PEACEBUILDING AND LOCAL
RESISTANCE (2011). Hybridized forms of peacebuilding that involve a mixture of conventional and local
practices and models are also offered as one way to begin to move beyond the confines of liberal international
peacebuilding. See Edward Newman, Roland Paris, Oliver P. Richmond, Introduction, in NEW PERSPECTIVES
ON LIBERAL PEACEBUILDING 16 (Edward Newman et al. eds., 2009). In addition to being a useful analytical
tool, in some cases the concept is portrayed as “a desirable political project[] that could stimulate alternatives
and counter what is perceived to be hegemonic, externally driven liberal programming.” Peterson, supra note
70, at 10. For the application of a hybridity lens to post-conflict justice more specifically, see generally,
Chandra Lekha Sriram, Post-Conflict Justice and Hybridity in Peacebuilding: Resistance or Cooptation, in
HYBRID FORMS OF PEACE: FROM EVERYDAY AGENCY TO POST-LIBERALISM (Oliver Richmond & Audra
Mitchell eds., 2012).
240 Existing U.N. doctrine does not really allow for this. In a landmark 2004 report on transitional justice,
for example, former Secretary General Kofi Annan notes that “due regard must be given to indigenous and
informal traditions” yet suggests in the same sentence that “due regard” will only be extended insofar as there
is “conformity” with international standards. Rule of Law, supra note 1, at paras. 16-17, 36. As I suggest
below, space must be made for a substantial “margin of appreciation.”
241 See Lundy & McGovern, supra note 60, at 279 (noting that “[d]espite being identified as key issues in
international reports and development circles for years, the virtues of local ownership, empowerment, and
participatory approaches have tended only to be implemented in a vague, weak, and ad hoc manner.”).
242 See Harvey Weinstein et al., Stay the Hand of Justice; Whose Priorities Take Priority, in LOCALIZING
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: INTERVENTIONS AND PRIORITIES AFTER MASS VIOLENCE 35 (Rosalind Shaw & Lars
Waldorf eds., 2010) (noting that “there has been little room for consideration of broader or alternative
approaches, especially those that might emerge out of different or non-western conceptions of justice.”).
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place greater emphasis on the local or non-Western,243 requiring instead a more
fundamental re-consideration of what it means to “do justice” in times of
transition.244 After all, it would be all too easy for mainstream transitional
justice programs and professionals to embrace the local to the extent that it
resonates with and resembles Western norms and institutions, using the
trappings of the local in an attempt to boost legitimacy and buy-in to a larger
set of projects.245 Yet this would represent at best a form of co-option, a
leveraging of the local only insofar as it stands in conformity with the global.
In the end, giving more than rhetorical weight to principles of local
ownership in matters of post-conflict justice will require a significant “margin
of appreciation”246 and acceptance of an at-times uncomfortable pluralism247—
forcing us to stand on that tenuous yet inevitable middle ground between
universalism and relativism.248 However, striking a global-local balance also
means that one particular local will at times have to give way to a larger
local.249 This reflects the simple recognition that neither global nor local
dimensions of justice holds a monopoly on emancipatory projects, possibilities,
and wisdom.

243 See Okello, supra note 64, at 277 (noting that a call for greater weight to be placed on the local “does
not in itself represent a shift in the underlying assumptions of the field—at most, it is a shift in emphasis.”).
244 See An-Na’im, supra note 39, at 197 (observing that the dominant transitional justice paradigms are so
strong that “even the possibility of an indigenous alternative conception of justice is not taken seriously at a
theoretical or empirical level.”).
245 See Baines, supra note 3, at 411–12, 414–15.
246 See Viaene & Brems, supra note 23, at 210 (reviewing the margin of appreciation doctrine that has
developed under the European Convention on Human Rights).
247 On the complexities of legal pluralism in international law more broadly, see generally Brian
Tamanha, Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 375 (2008).
248 Using different terminology, scholars from a range of disciplines have made attempts to carve out a
position between strong universalism and strong relativism. See, e.g., Ronald Cohen, Human Rights and
Cultural Relativism: The Need for A New Approach, 91 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 1014, 1015–16 (1989) (calling
for a middle ground between “simplistic polarities of relativism versus universalism.”); Gérard CohenJonathan, Universalité et Singularité des Droits de l’Homme, 53 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE
L’HOMME 1, 11 (2003) (discussing a “pluralist” conception of human rights); Paul Healy, Human Rights and
Intercultural Relations, 32 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 513, 513 (2006) (arguing for a middle ground between
ethnocentric universalism and radical cultural relativism); Anne Hellum, Women’s Human Rights and African
Customary Laws: Between Universalism and Relativism – Individualism and Communitarianism, 10 EUR. J.
DEV. RES. 88, 96 (1998) (using the idea of “cultural pluralism” to create a space between universalism and
relativism).
249 See Mazlish, supra note 25, at 99 (discussing the idea of local giving way to larger local).
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CONCLUSION
Dilemmas of the global and the local are now firmly entwined in
transitional justice narratives, sticky strands that we can neither remove nor let
go. Those dilemmas call on us to interrogate the historical and ideological
origins of the field, grounded as it has been in Western liberalism and legalism,
and may even point to the need to abandon traditional paradigms of
“transition” altogether.250 While one should avoid simplistic notions of path
dependency, an examination of origins remains useful in helping to identify
some of the lingering assumptions and blind spots that have in part helped to
generate many of the global-local frictions so often associated with transitional
justice interventions today.
At one level, attempts to resolve or at least manage these dilemmas reflect a
healthy pragmatism and acknowledgement that transitional justice efforts are
unlikely to contribute to larger aims of post-conflict reconstruction if they are
not embraced by those who have to live with them, making questions of
legitimacy and sustainability paramount. Yet beyond pragmatism, increasing
attention paid to concepts like local ownership may reflect a deeper
ambivalence with the imperiousness of international justice and some measure
of discomfort with the sotto voce imperialism of liberal international
peacebuilding more generally.251 Few Western countries or world powers, for
example, would accept some of the more intrusive dimensions of international
justice. At the same time, the local also inspires another sort of moral
ambivalence. Global institutions now insist that the local must be given “due
regard,” but wring hands over where due regard must give way to international
standards and best practices.252 In the end, the dilemmas of the global and the
local therefore express tensions between different normative commitments,
between liberal internationalism and international human rights on the one
hand, and principles of local sovereignty and autonomy on the other.
Yet if we are to do more than repeat that addressing the dilemmas of the
global and local is both important and hard, we must start by questioning
simple categories and narratives of global and local, coming to understand

250

See generally An-Na’im, supra note 39, at 197.
See Uvin, supra note 14, at 186 (arguing that “[t]aken to its extreme, the new post-conflict agenda,
then, amounts to a license for interventionism so deep and unchecked it resembles colonialism”).
252 For an argument that so-called “best practices” tend to promote an undesirable uniformity and bias
interventions towards the global rather than the local, see generally Warren Feek, Best of Practices?, 17 DEV’T
IN PRACTICE 653 (2007).
251
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transitional justice processes instead as part of a more complicated dialectical
process that moves between multiple levels. At the same time, we must
carefully parse what we mean by local ownership. The normative currency of
the local is now such that concepts like local ownership can be used as a
legitimate shield—as a form of resistance to the hegemony of liberal
international peacebuilding and a way to carve out a legitimate sphere of
autonomy in matters of post-conflict justice—but also as a talisman by
enterprising elites who would seek donor dollars while furthering their own
partisan political agendas.253 Coming to understand local ownership along its
multiple dimensions or axes—including control, process, and substance—
might help to clarify thinking in crafting future experiments in transitional
justice. Such experiments will hopefully build upon more equitable globallocal partnerships, reflecting an acceptance of genuine practices of hybridity
that take us beyond the self-imposed parameters of the transitional justice
“toolbox.”

253

See Iliff, supra note 237, at 262.

